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DO MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ARTICLE III 
STANDING TO SUE MORTGAGE LENDERS UNDER 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT? 
Samuel Marll

 
INTRODUCTION 
“I believe when somebody owns their own home, they’re realizing the 
American Dream.”
1
 
 
By 2008, the U.S. housing market had veered off a cliff.
2
  Along with 
it went many Americans’ life savings, cities’ tax bases and any realistic 
hope of a speedy macroeconomic recovery.  As the financial contagion 
spread and layoffs arrived in force, millions of taxpayers residing in 
metropolitan areas faced the twin specters of foreclosure and eviction.  
Inner city rot only deepened as foreclosed-upon and vacant homes gave rise 
to higher crime rates and intensified the strain on cash-strapped public 
welfare agencies. 
Battered by waves of foreclosures and desperate for relief, four cities 
brought suit in federal court against the largest mortgage lenders and 
 

 J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2013.  B.A. Economics,  
Gettysburg College, 2008.  The author would like to thank Professor Theodore W. Ruger for 
his supervision and advice, and the editorial staff of the Penn Journal of Business Law for 
their diligent efforts.  Special thanks go to my family and friends for their support during the 
comment-drafting process, and in particular, Michael Marll, Kyle Rhood, and Thane 
Schweyer.   
 1.  President George W. Bush, Address to HUD Employees on National 
Homeownership Month (June 18, 2002), http://archives.hud.gov/remarks/martinez/speeches 
/presremarks.cfm. 
 2.  See Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, National Composite Home Price Index for the 
United States, FRED ECONOMIC DATA (last updated Nov. 28, 2012, 8:32 AM), 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USCSCOMHPISA?cid=32261 (observing the 
dramatic fall in home prices between 2006 and  2008); Bob Brundage, Real Estate: More 
Homes in Nevada Underwater Than Anywhere in U.S., RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 
2011, available at BIZ, available at 2011 WLNR 4970992 (stating that sixty-five percent of 
all Nevada mortgages were underwater, followed by Arizona at fifty-one percent, Florida at 
forty-seven percent, Michigan at thirty-six percent, and California at thirty-two percent). 
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securitizers.
3
  Three cities allege that Citigroup and Wells Fargo violated 
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, by using “reverse 
redlining” techniques to target minority borrowers with subprime mortgage 
products.  These loans were purportedly aimed at minority borrowers to 
maximize the principal, interest, and fees that could be extracted from 
prospective homeowners who had neither the wherewithal to repay the 
loans nor the financial literacy to understand the transactions.  Once the 
housing bubble popped and the U.S. labor market went into free fall, the 
ensuing mortgage defaults and foreclosures resulted in vast urban dead 
zones of vacant, crumbling houses. 
The cities allegedly suffered two distinct injuries from lenders’ reverse 
redlining.  First, the mass foreclosures resulted in sizable reductions in 
property tax receipts, shrinking already-limited municipal budgets.
4
  
Second, the now-empty housing units became prime fodder for drug 
dealers, squatters and other criminals.
5
  In response, the cities were forced 
to divert scarce law enforcement resources to continually patrol and 
investigate abandoned properties.
6
  Even without the resulting spike in 
crime rates, the vacant units required constant maintenance and fire safety 
inspections.  These ongoing risks imposed onerous fiscal burdens on cities 
already struggling to provide basic services to their residents.  The cities 
alleged that but for the lenders’ discriminatory lending practices, neither 
the loss of property tax receipts nor the increased expenditure on crime 
control and infrastructure maintenance would have been necessary.
7
 
The lenders responded to this initial salvo of complaints with a 
barrage of motions to dismiss for lack of standing.
8
  They argued that 
 
 3.  City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123123 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & 
Injunctive Relief & Damages, City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-
STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis 
Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Damages, Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010) (No. JFM 108—
CV-00062); Second Amended Complaint, City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-139). 
 4.  Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 140(a) (alleging that Wells Fargo’s reverse 
redlining caused loss of property tax revenue); Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory & 
Injunctive Relief & Damages ¶ 320, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Baltimore 3d 
Complaint] (seeking damages for lost property tax revenues). 
 5.  Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 142. 
 6.  Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 119-308. 
 7.  E.g., id. ¶¶ 97-108 (alleging that but for Wells Fargo’s racially motivated steering 
of customers into subprime loans, “borrower[s] would have continued to make payments on 
the mortgage and remained in possession of the premises”). 
 8.  E.g., Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third 
Amended Complaint at 6, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
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neither reductions in tax revenue nor increased spending on municipal 
services qualified as cognizable injuries-in-fact for Article III standing 
purposes.
9
  Even conceding that these economic losses constituted 
actionable harms, the causal chain connecting any purportedly illegal 
mortgage practices and the resulting urban blight was too attenuated.  That 
is, the cities’ harms were not fairly traceable to the lenders’ conduct, and 
the injuries were too derivative of those sustained by third parties (i.e., the 
foreclosed-upon homeowners).
10
  Thus, the lenders concluded, the plaintiff 
cities were not the proper parties to bring suit.  District courts in Alabama, 
Maryland, Ohio, and Tennessee have decided these motions in mixed ways. 
These motions to dismiss have been met with mixed success in district 
courts in Alabama, Maryland, Ohio and Tennessee. 
This Comment analyzes whether municipalities possess Article III 
standing to sue mortgage lenders in federal court for FHA violations.  
Starting with a quick primer on reverse redlining and its economic impact, I 
move into a literature review.  I argue that, contrary to existing literature, 
cities lack constitutional standing to sue under the FHA.  I reach this 
conclusion based on comparisons to the tobacco and handgun litigation 
from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Using a framework 
for causation drawn from the antitrust and RICO contexts, I determine that 
courts should grant lenders’ 12(b)(1) motions.  I conclude with the 
implications for municipalities, both as marginal actors in a federalist 
system and in the immediate wake of the national mortgage settlement 
between the large banks, federal government and state attorneys general. 
 
A. Economic Backdrop of the Reverse Redlining Problem 
 
“You will love this place.  There are no Black people here.”
11
 
 
 
No. JFM-08-62, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 62 (D. Md. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Standing doctrine 
requires the City to allege a plausible connection between specific loans and the vacancies 
to which the City traces its injuries.”). 
 9.  E.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (acknowledging that Wells Fargo 
challenges only the causation and injury-in-fact prongs of the constitutional standing 
inquiry). 
 10.  E.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at n.9, City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., 
No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 446523 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2009) (alleging 
that any causal connection between Birmingham’s injuries and Citigroup’s conduct was 
broken by a third party’s independent action). 
 11.  Protecting the American Dream (Part II): Combating Predatory Lending Under 
the Fair Housing Act Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 88 (2010) 
(statement of Thomas Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) 
(describing one realtor’s statement to an undercover “tester” for HUD). 
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This Comment focuses on a particular subset of predatory lending that 
became rampant during the bubble years, known as “reverse redlining.”  
The practice consists of “offering high-priced mortgage loans to non-white 
‘house-rich but cash-poor’ consumers,” on more punitive terms relative to 
those offered to Caucasian borrowers.
12
  Lenders “specifically target and 
aggressively solicit minority, elderly and low-income homeowners who 
have traditionally been denied access to mainstream sources of credit.”
13
  
The extent to which reverse redlining may have permeated the U.S. 
mortgage market over the last few decades is staggering.
14
  As the ongoing 
foreclosure crisis continues to expose significant levels of race-based 
lending in urban areas, it is only in the last few years that regulators have 
begun to address the degree to which racial prejudices infected the major 
banks’ lending policies.
15
  Wholly separate from the destabilizing effects on 
 
 12.  William Apgar, Assistant Sec’y for Hous. & Fed. Hous. Comm’r, Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services 
(May 24, 2000) (transcript available at http://archives.hud.gov/testimony/2000/5-
24apgar.cfm); see also United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 
(D. Mass. 1998) (defining reverse redlining as “the practice of extending credit on unfair 
terms” to minority communities); Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: 
Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94. CAL. L. REV. 101, 102 n.9 
(2006) (defining reverse redlining as “the targeting of persons for credit on unfair terms 
based on their income, race, or ethnicity.”). 
 13.  Apgar, supra note 12. 
 14.  Segregation as a Driver of Subprime Lending and the Ensuing Economic Fallout: 
Comments Before the Joint Economic Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Gregory 
D. Squires, Professor, George Washington Univ.) (relying on HMDA data to conclude that 
at the peak of subprime lending in 2006, 53% of African American borrowers in nonwhite 
communities received subprime loans, compared to 46% of Hispanics and 22% of whites); 
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in 
Subprime Lending, HUD ARCHIVES (Apr. 2000), http://archives.hud.gov/reports/subprime/ 
subprime.cfm (noting that in 1998 fifty-one percent of home loans in predominantly black 
neighborhoods were subprime, compared to nine percent in predominately white areas). 
 15.  See, e.g., Written Agreement Between Wells Fargo & Co. and Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, Docket Nos. 11-094-B-HC1, 11-094-I-HC1, 11-094-B-HC2 & 11-094-
I-HC2 (July 20, 2011) (assessing an eighty-five million dollar civil money penalty against 
Wells Fargo for improperly steering prime borrowers toward subprime loans); Jo Ann 
Barefoot & Andy Sandler, Red Alert on Redlining: Renewed Attention Plus Crisis Aftermath 
Stir Up Major Trouble for Banks, ABA BANKING JOURNAL, Mar. 2011, at 34 (noting that 
“banking agencies have made more than 40 fair-lending referrals over the past two years” to 
the Justice Department which “has announced four fair-lending settlements” for, among 
other things, “redlining and charging higher rates and fees . . . to members of protected 
classes”); Brent Kendall, Victims Sought in Countrywide Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2011, 
at C3 (announcing the Justice Department’s $335 million settlement with Countrywide that 
resolved allegations that Countrywide charged higher fees and interest to African American 
and Hispanic borrowers between 2004 and 2008); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Settlement with AIG Subsidiaries to Resolve 
Allegations of Lending Discrimination (Mar. 4, 2010), http://ww 
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financial markets, reverse redlining may have entrenched existing patterns 
of racial distribution across metropolitan areas.
16
  Worse, decades of 
agonizing economic progress for African Americans have been undone as 
the mortgage market’s contraction continues apace, with the credit crunch 
disproportionately harming minority access to conventional banking 
channels.
17
 
However, the purpose of this Comment is not to educate the reader on 
the evils of reverse redlining and the deleterious effects that predatory 
lending has on the social fabric.
18
  Other authors cover that topic, and in 
 
w.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crt-226.html (stating that two AIG subsidiaries agreed 
to pay $6.1 million “to resolve allegations that they engaged in a pattern of or practice of 
discrimination against African American borrowers”); Tracy Russo, Enforcement of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, THE JUSTICE BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/ 
blog/archives/1292 (announcing formation of fair lending unit in Justice Department’s 
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section). 
 16.  RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, A COMMENT ON BANK OF 
AMERICA/COUNTRYWIDE’S DISCRIMINATORY MORTGAGE LENDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RACIAL SEGREGATION 3 (Jan. 3, 2012) (warning that reverse redlining could have 
“reinforced, and may even have intensified, racial segregation in our major metropolitan 
areas”). 
 17.  Christine Dugas, ‘Dual System’: Minorities Lose Financial Ground, Critics Say, 
USA TODAY (last updated Apr. 5, 2011, 5:20:27 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2011-04-04-real-estate-financial-
discrimination.htm (noting that the “overall share of conventional prime mortgage lending 
in communities of color fell 35%, while the share of loans to predominantly white 
neighborhoods increased 11%”); Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Delinquent 
Debt Shrinks While Real Estate Debt Continues to Fall (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://data.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2012/an120227.html (noting that 
mortgage and home equity lines of credit continued to fall, dropping $146 billion in 
2011:Q4). 
 18.  I take care to note that subprime lending and predatory lending, which includes 
reverse redlining, are not coterminous.  While plenty of overlap exists between the two, they 
are conceptually distinct.  HUD and Treasury define predatory lending as “engaging in 
deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking 
unfair advantage of a borrower’s lack of understanding about loan terms.”  Predatory 
Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. n.19 (2001) (testimony of Thomas J. 
Miller, Att’y Gen., State of Iowa).  One California court characterized predatory lending as 
“a range of abusive and aggressive lending practices, including deception or fraud, charging 
excessive fees and interest rates, making loans without regard to a borrower’s ability to 
repay, or refinancing loans repeatedly over a short period of time to incur additional fees 
without any economic gain to the borrower.”  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 
P.3d 813, 815 (Cal. 2005).  Victims tend to be “homeowners who frequently cannot pay the 
associated costs and therefore lose their homes.”  Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, 
City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 757 (2007).  
Contrast this with legal subprime lending, which merely consists of offering mortgages “to 
people who represent a higher level of risk than borrowers who meet standard prime 
underwriting guidelines.”  KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME 
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greater detail than here.
19
  My interest lies with local governments’ 
disparate attempts to contain the fallout created by lenders’ racial practices.  
In the next section, I describe cities’ efforts to stanch the fiscal 
hemorrhaging. 
 
B. Cities’ Resort to Litigation in the Federal Courts 
 
“Subprime loan officers described African-American and other 
minority customers by saying ‘those people have bad credit’ and ‘those 
people don’t pay their bills,’ and by calling minority customers ‘mud 
people’ and ‘niggers.’  They referred to loans in minority communities as 
‘ghetto loans.’”
20
 
 
In response to the loss of property tax revenue and increased 
municipal spending perceived to be a byproduct of lenders’ reverse 
redlining tactics, four cities filed civil suits in federal court against 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.
21
  Three 
complaints allege FHA violations, along with state law claims under 
consumer protection statutes and common law.
22
  The fourth complaint, 
filed by the City of Cleveland, targeted mortgage-backed securities issuers 
under a common law public nuisance theory of liability.
23
 
The cities did not allege that the lenders or securitizers engaged in 
direct racial discrimination against them.
24
  Instead, Baltimore, 
 
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 4 (Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
2002). 
 19.  See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the 
Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 169-75 (2009) (discussing reverse redlining practices and 
their impact on municipalities and communities of color); Brett Altier, Note, Municipal 
Predatory Lending Regulation in Ohio: The Disproportionate Impact of Preemption on 
Ohio’s Cities, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125, 129-34 (2011) (describing predatory lending and 
its economic impact). 
 20.  Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 56 (citation omitted). 
 21.  See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 498-99 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (discussing the complaint filed by the city of Cleveland). 
 24.  E.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207-08 (1972) (“The 
complaint alleged that the owner had discriminated against nonwhite rental applicants in 
numerous ways, e.g., making it known to them that they would not be welcome . . . 
manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their applications, using 
discriminatory acceptance standards, and the like.”); Stevens v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 
Ind., 663 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (alleging that defendants violated the Fair Housing 
Act by “locating her publicly-funded apartment building in a primarily African-American 
neighborhood, [and] segregating her on account of race”); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
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Birmingham, and Memphis each alleged that Citigroup and Wells Fargo 
engaged in reverse redlining against their taxpayers in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act.
25
  Relying on statistical data, the cities argued that African 
American residents were targeted with subprime loans at rates much higher 
than those of financially comparable Caucasian borrowers.
26
  The cities cite 
testimony of former loan officers who describe employee incentive 
programs for targeting ostensibly less-sophisticated minority borrowers 
with toxic mortgage products.
27
  Black homeowners were saddled with 
mortgages that had interest rates, fees and other conditions that made the 
loans more onerous than prime mortgages.
28
  These race-based steering 
practices were allegedly accompanied by campaigns of out-and-out 
deception on the part of lower level employees.
29
  These high-cost loans 
were disproportionately located in African American neighborhoods in 
Baltimore, Birmingham, and Memphis.
30
  The time between default and 
foreclosure on delinquent mortgages owed by African Americans was 
especially quick compared with the experience of white borrowers in 
delinquent mortgage situations.
31
  As a result of the banks’ illegal lending 
practices, an “excessive and disproportionately high number of foreclosures 
in African-American neighborhoods” resulted once the housing sector’s 
 
Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) (asserting that the township’s 
redevelopment plan discriminated against minorities, violating the Fair Housing Act). 
 25.  See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011) (asserting that Wells Fargo 
targeted African American mortgage borrowers); Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (D. Md. 2010) (noting the city’s assertion that “Wells 
Fargo . . . target[ed] the City’s underserved and vulnerable minority neighborhoods . . . , 
causing an increase in abandoned and vacant homes in those areas”). 
 26.  See City of Memphis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *3 (noting that “41% of 
Wells Fargo loans resulting in foreclosures occurred in African-American neighborhoods,” 
compared to only 23.6% of foreclosures occurring in predominantly white neighborhoods). 
 27.  See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 101) (describing “large commissions 
and bonuses of up to $10,000 a month for meeting Wells Fargo’s quotas for subprime 
loans”); see also Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 59 (alleging that bank 
representatives made more money in referral fees by sending borrowers to subprime loan 
officers, creating a system that paid out “‘bounties’ on minority borrowers”). 
 28.  See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 96 (alleging that Wells Fargo’s 
lending practices pushed borrowers to take out loans “more onerous than loans for which 
they qualif[ied]”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 111-16 (alleging that Wells Fargo 
ordered employees to mislead customers about closing costs, fees, adjustable rates, size of 
mortgage payments, prepayment penalties and other terms and conditions). 
 30.  See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 72, 74 (showing, through Wells 
Fargo’s own data, that Wells Fargo issued high-cost loans to forty-three percent of African 
American customers in Baltimore, particularly in certain historically black neighborhoods). 
 31.  Id. ¶ 89 (alleging that there is an approximately sixty-five day difference between 
average time of foreclosure for white borrowers and for black borrowers). 
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implosion triggered a broader economic decline.
32
  As a result, the cities 
suffered reductions in property tax receipts on vacant housing units and 
were forced to increase spending on the municipal services required to 
combat accelerated urban decrepitude.
33
 
In response, the lenders moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 
alleging the municipalities lacked Article III standing to sue.
34
  
Birmingham and Cleveland saw their complaints dismissed due to standing 
and proximate causation problems.
35
  Baltimore survived Wells Fargo’s 
12(b)(1) motions only after repeatedly amending its complaint to satisfy 
constitutional standing requirements.  Memphis also withstood Wells 
Fargo’s 12(b)(1) motion after modeling its complaint on Baltimore’s.
36
  
Clearly, potential exists for lenders to escape liability for reverse redlining 
violations via this attack on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 
the case.  Depending on how courts choose to resolve the city standing 
issue, municipalities may be barred from seeking judicial redress for 
damage sustained as a result of lenders’ illegal practices. 
Furthermore, given the recent mortgage settlement between federal 
regulators, the state attorneys general and the largest mortgage lenders, 
claims under the FHA may prove to be invaluable in undoing the harm 
inflicted on cities and taxpayers by reverse redlining.
37
  The national 
 
 32.  Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 4. 
 33.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 142-45 (describing harms caused by vacancy, including “squatters, 
increased risk of crime and fire, and infrastructure damage such as burst water pipes and 
broken windows” as well as environmental issues, all of which require expensive “police 
and fire calls and housing code enforcement efforts”). 
 34.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (stating that a party may assert lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction as a defense to a claim for relief). 
 35.  See City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123123, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (holding that “the City does not have 
standing to pursue any of these claims against the Defendants”); City of Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (finding that 
because “the allegations [are] . . . insufficient to establish proximate causation, the City’s 
public nuisance claim fails as a matter of law”); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ¶ 14-21, 
City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44652 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (arguing that Birmingham failed to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact that 
is fairly traceable to Citigroup). 
 36.  See City of Memphis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *16 (noting similarities 
between the Memphis, Baltimore and Birmingham suits); id. at *52 (denying Wells Fargo’s 
12(b)(1) motion). 
 37.  On March 12, 2012, the Justice Department, HUD, and forty-nine state attorneys 
general filed with the District of the District of Columbia a set of consent judgments with 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Ally Financial amounting to 
approximately twenty-five billion dollars in financial relief for borrowers and monetary 
sanctions.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement 
Filed in Federal Court (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-news-release.pdf.  The 
MARLL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/25/2012  4:25 PM 
2012] DO MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING? 261 
 
settlement with Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and 
Wells Fargo bars both state and federal regulators from bringing a wide 
range of civil claims against the lenders, including, but not limited to, “any 
civil or administrative claim, of any kind whatsoever, direct or indirect, that 
an Attorney General or [state mortgage] Regulator, respectively, has or 
may have or assert, including, without limitation, claims for damages, 
fines, injunctive relief, remedies, sanctions, or penalties of any kind . . . .” 
38
  
However, despite the broad language of the releases, they appear confined 
to state and federal entities, and not local governments.
39
  Direct suits by 
the cities against the banks may represent a substantial opportunity to 
extract compensatory damages from these financial institutions. 
This Comment addresses the question of whether cities have Article 
III standing to pursue FHA claims against lenders for reverse redlining.  I 
conclude that cities do not have standing to sue under the FHA, due to 
difficulties with satisfying the “fairly traceable” component of the standing 
inquiry necessary to sue in federal courts.
40
  I begin with a brief review of 
the existing literature on this subject.  The consensus is that actions under 
the FHA comprise a viable means of achieving restitution for harms 
sustained by cities as a result of lenders’ racially motivated lending 
practices.  However, much of the literature predates the first wave of 
 
settlements include “a broad release of the banks’ conduct related to mortgage loan 
servicing, foreclosure preparation, and mortgage loan participation services.”  PHILIP A. 
LEHMAN, NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL 
SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 4 (2012), available at 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summa 
ry-7-23-2012.pdf.  Importantly, “[c]laims based on these areas of past conduct by the banks 
cannot be brought by state attorneys general or banking regulators.”  Id.; see, e.g., Consent 
Judgment at G-5, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC 
(D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Consent_Judgme 
nt_BoA-4-11-12.pdf (releasing Bank of America from liability for various types of potential 
civil claims made by states).  However, the terms of the settlement specifically provide that 
the release does not extinguish either claims arising out of fair lending laws or any claims by 
county and local governments.  Id. at G-9. 
 38.  Id. at G-5.  Similar consent judgments with JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo have 
been filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia.  The settlement requires the 
lenders to pay five billion dollars in cash to the federal and state governments, plus twenty 
billion dollars toward “various forms of financial relief to homeowners,” including principal 
reductions on underwater mortgages and loan refinancings.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, $25 Billion Mortg. Servicing Agreement Filed in Fed. Court (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-asg-306.html. 
     39.    Consent Judgment at G-9, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:12-cv-
00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Cons 
ent_Judgment_BoA-4-11-12.pdf.   
 40.  While a few municipalities have brought suit against lenders in state court, this 
Comment does not address the ability of cities to sue in state court because the rules for 
standing to sue in state court vary by jurisdiction. 
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municipality-sponsored FHA litigation.  This Comment is poised to draw 
new insights from the recently completed initial round of city-lender 
litigation.  Existing literature disregards the “fairly traceable” element of 
the standing inquiry.  Akin to a highly informal proximate causation test, 
standing law requires that the plaintiff allege injuries that can be “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.  Much of the existing literature 
glosses over this requirement, rendering it a formality in the pleadings.  
Extending an analytical framework from the antitrust and RICO contexts 
for economic losses, I argue that the multitude of independent causal 
factors between any reverse redlining and eventual fiscal harm to the 
municipality renders it impossible for city-plaintiffs to satisfy this element 
of the standing test.  As such, courts should dismiss FHA actions instituted 
by cities on this theory of liability. 
First, I summarize the existing literature on this topic and the 
conclusions other authors have drawn.  I rule out the possibility that cities 
can sue in parens patriae.  I then delve into the standing analysis.  
Conceding that the economic losses sustained by cities constitute 
cognizable injuries-in-fact and that a favorable judicial decision would 
provide adequate redress, I make my stand on the “fairly traceable” 
component.  I conclude with preemptive counter-responses to those who 
would argue that the cities possess constitutional standing, and ruminations 
on what this means for foreclosure-wracked municipalities going forward. 
 
I.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“Where a city can demonstrate that lenders have deceived borrowers 
into accepting loans on terms that they could not afford and, as a result, 
the borrowers lost or could not maintain their homes, resulting in reduced 
tax revenues and increased demand for city services, a court could find that 
the city‘s injuries were ‘fairly traceable’ to the predatory lending.”
41
 
 
In this section, I conduct a brief overview of the literature on 
municipalities’ Article III standing to pursue various types of claims in 
federal court, including under the Fair Housing Act, state consumer 
protection statutes and common law public nuisance. 
Most of the literature on the subject acknowledges, albeit briefly, the 
notion that cities must first establish standing to sue predatory lenders.
42
  
 
 41.  Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?  Redressing the Externalities of 
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 376 (2006). 
 42.  E.g., David D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 21, 27 
(2010), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/123forum_troutt.pdf (noting that 
“[c]ities suing lenders in their own capacities face federal standing hurdles on parens 
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However, several existing publications predate the city-sponsored litigation 
arising out of the 2008 financial crisis.
43
  Kathleen Engel’s 2006 article 
focuses primarily on “whether cities have standing to recover damages for 
the externalities that predatory lenders impose on them and whether cities 
have standing as parens patriae to protect the interests of their residents.” 
44
  
After a short introduction of the threshold issue of standing, Engel moves 
quickly to consider whether cities can institute parens patriae suits to 
remedy harms suffered by a large segment of the resident population.
45
  
This includes a brief discussion of the separate elements required to 
establish parens patriae standing:  (1) quasi-sovereign interests in the 
public welfare vindicated by the suit, (2) numerosity of citizens harmed by 
the defendant’s alleged behavior, and (3) an interest in the controversy 
wholly distinct from that of private parties involved in the action.
46
 
The author notes that the lower federal courts have securely locked the 
courthouse doors to cities seeking to sue as parens patriae, observing that: 
 [t]he federal courts have unequivocally held that political 
subdivisions cannot bring claims as parens patriae because their 
power is derivative, not sovereign.  Thus, cities bringing claims 
as quasi-sovereigns in federal court or whose claims as quasi-
sovereigns are removed to federal court are certain to face 
dismissal . . . . [T]he federal courts have made it clear that they 
will not grant cities quasi-sovereign standing.
47
   
Engel then briefly discusses the possibility of filing suit in state court as a 
means of escaping the federal courts’ heightened standing requirements.
48
  
Having established the futility of bringing federal derivative actions on the 
taxpayer’s behalf, Engel also addresses the hurdles to proprietary litigation 
against mortgage lenders in federal court that are posed by Article III 
standing doctrine. 
Engel’s analysis focuses primarily on injury-in-fact and conduct fairly 
 
patriae grounds” and “cities are often denied standing to sue in federal court”). 
 43.  E.g., Kyle Cutts, Comment, City on the Brink: The City of Cleveland Sues Wall 
Street for Public Nuisance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1399 (2008) (gauging the likelihood of 
success of Cleveland’s then-pending public nuisance lawsuit, including potential standing 
and proximate causation barriers to recovery); Frank Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing 
Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 94 (1999) (noting 
that the FHA’s lax prudential standing requirement, which “extend[s] to the full reach 
permitted by the Constitution,” may prove to be the most viable method for combating 
reverse redlining). 
 44.  Engel, supra note 41, at 355. 
 45.  Id. at 362. 
 46.  Id. at 361-65. 
 47.  Id. at 365-68. 
 48.  Id. at 366-68. 
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traceable to the defendant’s actions.  She validly observes that “[w]hen 
predatory lending leads to abandoned and neglected homes, cities 
experience declines in tax revenues . . . . Numerous courts have held that 
lost tax revenues can affect governmental entities’ proprietary interests.”
49
  
She also notes the second general class of harms that courts have 
acknowledged as constituting a cognizable injury for standing purposes—
increased expenditures on public services necessitated by the urban blight 
that follows a sudden wave of foreclosures. 
Whether by engaging in fraud, discrimination, or other forms of illegal 
activity, predatory lenders cause borrowers to become financially 
vulnerable.  Victims of predatory lending can lose their homes to 
foreclosure or forego necessities like food and heat in order to keep their 
homes.  They then turn to public agencies for assistance.  Cities must meet 
an increased demand for homeless shelters, heat subsidies, food stamps and 
other relief programs.  In addition, when families are dislocated, children’s 
educations are interrupted, which can impose added costs on cities.  
Neighborhoods become vulnerable, too.  Abandoned homes become targets 
for drug dealing and arson.  As neighborhoods lose their cohesion, crime 
increases.  The need for police and fire services rises in relation to 
neighborhood decline, further burdening city resources.  It is a short 
distance from acknowledgment of this immediate economic reality to the 
judicial conclusion that “[t]he increased costs for city services directly 
affects the proprietary interests of cities.”
50
 
However, Engel subordinates the “fairly traceable” element of the 
standing analysis to the “injury-in-fact” component, concluding that: 
Where a city can demonstrate that lenders have deceived 
borrowers into accepting loans on terms that they could not 
afford and, as a result, the borrowers lost or could not maintain 
their homes, resulting in reduced tax revenues and increased 
demand for city services, a court could find that the city’s injuries 
were ‘ fairly traceable’ to the predatory lending.
51
 
Similarly, Raymond Brescia’s 2009 article goes directly to the merits 
of Baltimore’s case against Wells Fargo.  Brescia restricts his inquiry to 
determining the proper test to apply in a disparate impact claim under the 
FHA, measuring the degree of reverse redlining in urban communities, 
applying the appropriate statistical tests to establish a prima facie case of 
reverse redlining, and devising the correct judicial response to lenders’ 
 
 49.  Id. at 374-75. 
 50.  Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added). 
 51.  Id. at 376. 
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affirmative defenses for subprime lending.
52
  He acknowledges the 
importance of establishing cities’ standing to sue in a proprietary capacity, 
but directs his attention elsewhere, beyond the threshold jurisdictional 
issue.
53
 
In a separate article published that same year, Brescia devotes some 
space to the argument that cities possess Article III standing.  He asserts 
“there is no doubt that governments have standing to bring suits alleging 
harms to their interests, either as property owners or in their 
representational capacity for their constituents.”
54
  Brescia compares the 
municipalities’ situation to that faced by states suing in their quasi-
sovereign capacities, and he relies on Massachusetts v. EPA to conclude 
that the recent Supreme Court case bolstered government claims of 
standing.
55
  In particular, he argues that alleging reduced property values 
arising from predatory lending is “sufficient enough to confer standing, 
especially where the municipality itself owns property impacted by 
foreclosures of subprime loans.”
56
 
Brescia expands on his assertions in an article from 2010.  Relying on 
the majority opinion from Massachusetts v. EPA, he argues that “[w]hile 
the Massachusetts decision is nominally about the rights of states, . . . there 
are also aspects of the decision that have implications for standing doctrine 
generally.”
57
  Brescia asserts that the relaxed standing requirements that 
attach to the states should be extended to municipalities as well.
58
  Based on 
this diluted test for Article III standing, he posits that “[a]ctions that 
contribute to harm, even when other forces may also be responsible for that 
harm, even overwhelmingly, are actionable.”
59
  This would include third 
parties whose actions resulted in a spike of foreclosures on private 
homeowners, thereby depressing local property tax receipts.
60
  Where the 
city can allege that a third party contributed to an actionable harm, that is 
enough to have caused that harm for standing purposes.
61
  Any parsing of 
 
 52.  Brescia, supra note 19, at 195-96. 
 53.  Id. at 195. 
 54.  Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in 
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 65 (2009). 
 55.  Id. at 64. 
 56.  Id. at 65. 
 57.  Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of 
Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 11 (2010). 
 58.  Id.; see also id. at 48-49 (concluding that “courts need to take a fresh look at 
causation in municipal lawsuits”). 
 59.  Id. at 48-49. 
 60.  Id. at 49. 
 61.  Id. at 49 (concluding that where “illegal loan terms contribute to the reasons that 
individual borrowers end up defaulting on their mortgages, the causation prong is met”). 
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separate causal factors must wait until the damages stage of the judicial 
process.
62
 
Delving into a historical analysis of standing doctrine as it relates to 
public nuisance actions, he cites Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast v. Cohen 
for the proposition that suits brought by private parties standing as 
“representatives of the public interest” should not automatically be 
excluded by Article III’s case or controversy clause.
63
  From there, Brescia 
discusses the historical tradition by which governmental bodies held the 
power to enjoin public nuisances, even without “proof of special injury.”
64
  
He is careful to qualify that this power has traditionally rested in the states, 
and a scrutiny of history does not provide an answer to whether any other 
public bodies have wielded this authority.
65
  Regardless, states may 
maintain a public nuisance action with a showing of harm to the 
community, and nothing more.
66
  The particularized injury requirements 
articulated in Lujan are not necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction.
67
 
Like Engel, Brescia aptly observes that as landowners, “municipalities 
can allege damage to . . . property due to actions that diminish the value of 
that property.”
68
  Brescia perceives that a showing of economic harms due 
to fair housing violations, by itself, is sufficient to grant constitutional 
standing, based on the analysis of Gladstone, Realtors.  He correctly states 
that the “questions of causation and redressability are nowhere to be found 
in the court’s Gladstone, Realtors decision . . . .”
69
  From this, he concludes 
that for the purposes of gauging a municipal entity’s standing to sue under 
the FHA, factual pleadings that establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, in the 
form of an economic loss to the city, are enough to survive a 12(b)(1) 
motion. 
Upon review of the literature, there appears to be no article or 
comment devoted exclusively to whether municipalities have Article III 
standing to pursue FHA claims against lenders for reverse redlining 
violations.  Rather, many authors proceed straight to the merits, choosing to 
focus their attention on the cities’ ability to establish disparate impact 
claims under the FHA.  Such an analysis puts the cart before the horse.  
This Comment addresses how and whether cities can get their foot in the 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 40-41 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 64.  Id. at 41-42. 
 65.  Id. at 42. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 44-45. 
 68.  Id. at 45. 
 69.  Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
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courthouse door at all. 
 
II. Why Can’t Cities Simply Sue on Behalf of Their Residents? 
 
“It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the 
air over its territory should not be polluted . . . that the forests on its 
mountains . . . should not be further destroyed or threatened . . . that the 
crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered . . . .”
70
 
 
Before I move to the Article III question, the reader likely asks why 
cities are barred from bringing suits on behalf of the public, much like an 
administrative agency or state.  However, derivative standing on behalf of 
the taxpayer is not a viable option for municipalities injured by lenders’ 
reverse redlining.  Bringing suit in this auxiliary capacity, otherwise known 
as parens patriae, is a common law concept with historical antecedents in 
English tradition.  The sovereign is vested “with powers and duties—the 
‘royal prerogative’—to protect certain interests of his subjects.”
71
  Rather 
than suing in a private capacity to remedy wrongs sustained to one’s own 
interests, the sovereign sues on behalf of the body politic.  In the United 
States, “the federal government and the states, as the twin sovereigns in our 
constitutional scheme, may in appropriate circumstances sue as parens 
patriae to vindicate interests of their citizens.”
72
  Over time, this concept 
morphed from an idea that the state has the power to intervene and 
“represent the interests of citizens who cannot represent themselves 
because they are under a disability,” into the notion that the state may 
“seek[] to protect a set of interests that it has in the well-being of its 
populace.”
73
 
One would intuit from a superficial reading of this doctrine that cities 
possess the power to sue lenders on behalf of their residents to abate the 
social ills that have befallen taxpayers as a result of the lenders’ alleged 
FHA violations—even if municipalities as governmental units have 
sustained none of these harms.  Indeed, Brescia relied on Massachusetts v. 
EPA’s relaxation of standing requirements for states to advance the 
 
 70.  Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907). 
 71.  In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 72.  Id. at 131. 
 73.  People ex rel. Hartigan v. Cheney, 726 F. Supp. 219, 222 (C.D. Ill. 1989).  See 
Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (“[T]he State has an interest independent of and behind the 
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 
U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“[I]t must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the 
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend 
them.”). 
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proposition that cities can also sue on behalf of taxpayers to protect the 
public interest without specifying any cognizable harm sustained by the 
municipality proper.
74
 
While states retain the ability to sue in this manner on behalf of the 
citizenry, that power typically stems from “the unique quasi-sovereign 
rights of a state to sue to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.”
75
  
In contrast, the longstanding Dillon’s Rule for municipal corporations 
states that cities are largely creatures of the state’s making.
76
  From this 
perspective on state and local relations, any power wielded by local 
governments is limited to what legislatures have delegated for the 
management of the local government’s day-to-day affairs.  Thus, any 
comparison of municipalities to state governments in the arena of abating 
threats to the public welfare through affirmative litigation is inapposite. 
Concededly, the Supreme Court has never specifically held that cities 
may not pursue parens patriae actions.
77
  Nonetheless, its unsympathetic 
treatment of these units “implies that they may not do so.”
78
  Yazback and 
Entin conclude as much based on “a more general view that cities and other 
 
 74.  See Brescia, supra note 54 (arguing that because Massachusetts v. EPA reduced the 
standing burden for government plaintiffs, municipalities “should have a far easier time 
overcoming the standing hurdle”); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) 
(stressing “the special position and interest of Massachusetts” as a sovereign state).  Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, relied on cases from the early twentieth century for the 
assertion that “States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  In a footnote, he referenced “the long development of cases permitting 
States ‘to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests—i.e., public or 
governmental interests that concern the state as a whole.’”  Id. at 520 n.17 (quoting 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 289-90 (5th ed. 2003)). 
 75.  Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 
243-44 (2d. Cir. 1999); see also Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 
2d 610 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that state governments can sue tobacco companies without 
regard to proximate cause, because of their inherent “political power,” “threat of legislative 
action” and the parens patriae right to protect the public health) (quoting Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 912, 934 n.18 (3d Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 
228 F.3d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 76.  See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 218 n.10 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (describing Dillon’s Rule as limiting a municipality’s powers to those expressly 
granted through the city’s charter, authorities implicit from those explicit delegations and 
powers essential to accomplishing the municipal corporation’s purposes); Terrence P. Haas, 
Note, Constitutional Home Rule in Rhode Island, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 677, 679-
80 (2006) (noting that Dillon’s Rule states that municipal corporations possess the powers 
explicitly delegated to them, the powers that are necessarily or fairly implied to those 
expressed powers and the powers that are essential to the declared purposes of the 
corporation). 
 77.  Entin & Yazback, supra note 18, at 763. 
 78.  Id. 
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political subdivisions do not enjoy the protections of the Eleventh 
Amendment because they are not sovereign.”
79
  This view of cities as the 
low men on the totem pole in the federalist system was affirmed in the 
1890 case of Lincoln County v. Luning and again in the 2001 case of Board 
of Trustees v. Garrett.
80
  Thus, it should come as no surprise that lower 
federal courts have consistently held that political subdivisions at the local 
level cannot sue as parens patriae.
81
  Hence, the parens patriae avenue to 
litigation is likely closed to cities, and perhaps rightfully so.
82
  Even if this 
mode of litigation were available to municipalities, this form of standing 
comes with its own burdensome requirements that must be satisfied to 
successfully invoke federal jurisdiction.
83
 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001); Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 
529, 530 (1890) (holding that political subdivisions do not get Eleventh Amendment 
protection). 
 81.  E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 
1985) (“[P]olitical subdivisions . . . cannot sue as parens patriae because their power is 
derivative and not sovereign.”); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1048 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (rejecting the city’s assertion of parens patriae standing because cities and 
counties cannot sue in a derivative capacity); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 
F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (noting that the “power of a political 
subdivision of a state is even more rigidly circumscribed” because “a city cannot sue as 
parens patriae, but is limited to the vindication of such of its own proprietary rights”), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 185 F.R.D. 184, 189 n.3 
(D.N.J. 1999) (recognizing courts’ refusal to let municipalities invoke parens patriae to 
obtain federal jurisdiction); City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1123 
(E.D.N.Y.) (stating that a city “generally does not have parens patriae standing”), aff’d, 742 
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d, 476 U.S. 467 (1986); Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 544 
F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that a municipal plaintiff “cannot maintain this 
action as parens patriae”). 
 82.  See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities?  On the 
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2545-46 (2006) 
(“American political decentralization is regional rather than municipal—states, not cities, 
are the salient sites for constitutionally protected ‘local’ governance.  As a result, cities and 
their leaders are three levels down the political food chain and must normally ask the states 
for whatever powers they have or wish to exercise.”).  In the context of his exposition on the 
role of the city mayor as executive officer, Schragger observes that “the city operates within 
a larger political and constitutional framework that significantly shapes the powers of the 
city and its officials.”  Id. at 2556.  Even those cities that enjoy substantial home rule power 
do so “contingent on grants of authority from the state or subject to revision by the state.”  
Id. at 2558. 
 83.  See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“In 
order to maintain such a[] [parens patriae] action, the State must articulate an interest apart 
from the interests of particular private parties . . . . The State must express a quasi-sovereign 
interest . . . . First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both 
physical and economic—of its residents in general.  Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign 
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.” ); 
see also New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 675, 678 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) 
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However, the capacity to sue in a proprietary interest remains 
available to cities.
84
  In this sense, a municipality acts as a private litigant 
and seeks redress for some harm it suffered, rather than suing on behalf of 
individual taxpayers.  This way, cities can sue on their own behalf to 
vindicate those interests that are consistent with the taxpayer’s interests.  
Given that the lower federal courts have closed off the parens patriae 
avenue for cities, if municipalities are going to get their day in court on a 
reverse redlining theory of liability, the prospective FHA action must be 
proprietary in nature.  Suing in a proprietary interest entails the 
conventional three-pronged standing inquiry fashioned by the courts over 
the last several decades. 
 
III. The Three-Part Standing Inquiry: Why Cities Cannot Sue in a 
Proprietary Capacity under the FHA to Recover on Reverse 
Redlining Violations 
 
“The City seeks to expand the law of standing to give every neighbor 
with a pest infestation and every crime victim within a few blocks of a 
house in foreclosure access to financial institutions in federal court.”
85
 
 
In this section, I discuss why cities lack Article III standing to sue 
mortgage lenders under the FHA.  I conclude that cities can allege 
significant economic losses as cognizable injuries-in-fact (specifically, 
reduced property tax values and increased public maintenance expenditures 
to remedy urban blight).  I also do not dispute the contention that a sizable 
damages award would work to remedy the harm inflicted on municipalities 
as they attempt to stem the rising tide of urban degradation, thereby 
satisfying the third “judicially redressable” element.  However, I break 
from existing literature with my contention that damages alleged by the 
cities cannot be said to be fairly traceable to the defendant-lenders’ 
conduct, given the array of independent causal factors working to create the 
harms suffered by the cities.  But first, I include a brief explanation of 
 
(conditioning a finding of parens patriae standing on a determination that “individuals 
involved could not obtain complete relief through a private suit”) (citing New York v. 11 
Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982)).  The upshot of the conditions necessary to 
support a finding of parens patriae standing is that “the required showing here [is] harder, 
not easier.”  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 84.  Harris, 601 F.2d at 1044; In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 
131 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 85.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third 
Amended Complaint at 11, City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, No. 1:08-CV-
00062-JFM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2010). 
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Article III standing. 
 
A. What Is Article III Standing? 
 
In this section, I provide a short overview of the constitutional 
doctrine known as Article III standing.  Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine 
that has evolved out of Article III’s cases and controversies requirement.
86
  
The court must ask “whether the constitutional or statutory provision on 
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the 
plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”
87
  Put another way, “[s]tanding 
concerns ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring th[e] suit.’”
88
 
Over time, the Supreme Court has specified the necessary elements to 
demonstrate the standing standing required for subject-matter jurisdiction.  
The three elements of Article III standing that a plaintiff must allege 
include:  (1) some cognizable injury-in-fact inflicted on the plaintiff (2) 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct which (3) can be redressed 
through a favorable court decision.
89
  The plaintiff bears the burden to 
allege facts that show that these three elements exist.
90
  Would-be plaintiffs 
ignore this component of subject-matter jurisdiction at their peril.  The 
court reporters are replete with cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due 
to plaintiffs’ failures to properly allege standing.
91
 
Its original justification was rooted in the constitutional separation of 
powers.
92
  Designed to prevent courts from issuing advisory opinions and 
 
 86.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . [and] 
controversies.”) 
 87.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
 88.  ProEnglish v. Bush, 70 F. App’x 84, 87 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). 
 89.  Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).  The injury-in-
fact can exist “solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing . . . .’”  Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 617 n.3 (1973)).  Even where the plaintiff is pursuing state law claims in a diversity 
action, the plaintiff must still satisfy the federal standards for standing, not the 
corresponding state court standard.  White v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 913 F.2d 165, 167 
(4th Cir. 1990). 
 90.  Warth, 422 U.S. at 518; W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 627 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
 91.  E.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(dismissing complaint in its entirety because plaintiffs “failed to set forth factual allegations 
establishing Article III standing”); Dash v. FirstPlus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 248 F. Supp. 
2d 489, 500 n.12 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (refusing to address the merits of plaintiff’s contentions 
because “the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter” for lack 
of standing). 
 92.  See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (noting that standing is “founded in concern about the 
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”); Vander Jagt v. 
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value judgments, standing ensures that abstract concerns for some subject 
do not imbue a plaintiff with the ability to have a court decide the merits of 
a dispute or a particular issue.
93
  The practical result is that the standing 
inquiry “focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal 
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.”
94
  This 
requirement ensures that all parties to the litigation have personal and 
diametrically opposed interests in the outcome.
95
  In the vast majority of 
cases litigated in the federal courts, “there is scant need for courts to pause 
over the standing inquiry . . . . In other sorts of cases, however, the nexus 
between the legal claim and the individual asserting the claim may not be 
so self-evident.”
96
 
In this Comment, I focus specifically on Article III standing and not 
on prudential standing, which is a closely related but still separate 
doctrine.
97
  Given that the Supreme Court “has held that standing to bring a 
FHA claim is coextensive with constitutional standing,” the question of 
whether a city can bring a claim under the FHA in a proprietary capacity 
collapses into the broader constitutional question.
98
  Thus, for the purposes 
of this analysis, one “need only assess the three requirements of 
 
O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring) (explaining that 
standing concerns “the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” ). 
 93.  Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26, 40 (1976) (“[A]n organization’s abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by 
an adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III.”); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (noting that the burden of producing some actionable injury 
is not reduced by virtue of suing in an organizational capacity); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Without this 
[standing] requirement, the federal judicial process would be transformed into ‘no more than 
a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.’”) (quoting 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 
464, 473 (1982)). 
 94.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). 
 95.  Id. at 101. 
 96.  Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 154. 
 97.  Prudential standing requires that the plaintiff assert its own interests (and not those 
of third parties).  Furthermore, those interests cannot amount to generalized grievances and 
must reside within the zone of interests protected by the statute granting the plaintiff his 
cause of action.  See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A 
plaintiff must also satisfy the non-constitutional standing requirements of the statute under 
which he or she seeks to bring suit . . . . Once the Article III standing requirement is 
satisfied, this is a purely statutory inquiry.”); Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 155 (“[A]n 
individual must also satisfy any statutory requirements for standing before bringing suit.”). 
 98.  Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coalition v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 573 
F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 
372 (1982). 
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constitutional standing . . . .”
99
  But before I do so, I discuss the appropriate 
standard of review for 12(b)(1) motions. 
 
B. The District Courts Apply the Twombly/Iqbal Standard of Review 
for a 12(b)(6) Motion to a 12(b)(1) Motion 
 
“The district court erroneously concluded that lack of Article III 
standing was grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  Though lack of statutory standing 
requires dismissal for failure to state a claim, lack of Article III standing 
requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”
100
 
 
As FHA litigation continues to bubble out of the cauldron of the 
foreclosure crisis, a curious schism has arisen in the district courts over the 
proper standard of review governing a motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing.  In reviewing lenders’ motions to dismiss, several district courts 
have elected to apply the heightened “plausibility” standard formulated for 
a 12(b)(6) motion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and later extended in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
101
  The courts’ use of Twombly and Iqbal to scrutinize 
whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring suit is wrong.  The Article 
III standing requirement did not evolve out of a need for plaintiffs to set 
forth “plausible” (as defined by Twombly and Iqbal) factual allegations 
that, taken as true, would entitle that party to relief.  Rather, standing 
formed as a response to the necessities of compliance with Article III’s 
“cases and controversies” requirement. 
At least one court of appeals has noted the problem with applying 
heightened scrutiny to the pleadings when reviewing a motion alleging lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.  In Maya v. Centex Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
noted the difference between a complaint’s failure to allege statutory 
standing, which is properly subject to a 12(b)(6) motion, and its failure to 
allege Article III standing, which is to be reviewed under 12(b)(1).  
 
 99.  Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
44013, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011). 
 100.  Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 101.  See Mayor of Baltimore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *5 (assuming that “the 
plausibility standard applies equally to allegations concerning standing”); see also, Dodaro 
v. Std. Pac. Corp., No. EDCV 09-01666-VAP (OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136, at *11-
12. (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010), rev’d and remanded, Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 
(9th Cir. 2011); Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34303 at *6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (concluding that when reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion 
to dismiss, “the Court must apply a standard similar to that applied in reviewing a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion”). 
MARLL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/25/2012  4:25 PM 
274 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
Carefully separating the merits of the case from threshold jurisdictional 
issues, Judge Fletcher observed that: 
Twombly and Iqbal are ill-suited to application in the 
constitutional standing context because in determining whether 
plaintiff states a claim under 12(b)(6), the court necessarily 
assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  But the threshold 
question of whether plaintiff has standing (and the court has 
jurisdiction) is distinct from the merits of his claim.  Rather, 
“[t]he jurisdictional question of standing precedes, and does not 
require, analysis of the merits.”  . . . This is not to say that 
plaintiff may rely on a bare legal conclusion to assert injury-in-
fact, or engage in an “ingenious academic exercise in the 
inconceivable” to explain how defendants’ actions caused his 
injury.  We simply note that Twombly and Iqbal deal with a 
fundamentally different issue, and that the court’s focus should 
be on the jurisprudence that deals with constitutional standing.
102
 
However, this doctrinal error has pervaded many of the district courts 
reviewing actions instituted by private homeowners for FHA violations, as 
well as those lawsuits involving municipalities suing to remedy urban 
blight generated by alleged reverse redlining.  Until more appeals from 
dismissals of FHA complaints for lack of standing reach the appellate 
courts, prospective municipal plaintiffs will likely have to formulate their 
pleadings in such a way that complies with Twombly and Iqbal’s 
particularity requirements, in order to overcome the Article III standing 
requirement. 
Before I move onto the FHA litigation, I emphasize that courts should 
not demand scientific precision in complaints by cities alleging the 
standing to sue.
103
  As a jurisdictional doctrine that does not go to the merits 
of the complaint, the inquiry should be tantamount to a highly-reduced 
form of review for proximate causation, like that found in tort law.  
However, under this simplified standard, cities must still allege something, 
and even under this quasi-proximate causation review, I assert that cities 
cannot satisfy even this reduced burden. 
 
C. Injury-in-Fact 
 
“Sausalito and its citizens and employees would be harmed by 
implementation of the Fort Baker Plan and the 2,700 daily visitors it would 
 
 102.  Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (citation omitted). 
 103.  See Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 162 (declining to “transform the ‘fairly 
traceable’ requirement into the kind of scientific inquiry that neither the Supreme Court nor 
Congress intended”); Mayor of Baltimore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *7. 
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unleash in numerous significant respects including . . . lost property and 
sales tax revenue due to impaired vehicular movement and commerce 
rendering Sausalito less attractive to business.”
104
 
 
Thus far, all of the complaints filed by municipalities have alleged two 
different categories of harm.  The first is reduction in property tax receipts. 
The cities typically allege that “[w]hen homes became vacant, local 
government incurred a series of expenses for police calls, fire calls, 
boarding-up and cleaning properties.”
105
  As a result, not only are precious 
municipal funds expended to prevent further deterioration of residential 
neighborhoods, but they must be diverted from cash-strapped city agencies, 
social insurance programs, and other important government projects.  The 
second category of harms generally alleged by the municipalities in their 
pleadings includes depressed property tax receipts arising out of the 
reduced home values that tend to accompany abandoned and vacant homes 
due to mass foreclosures. 
Over recent decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that 
erosion of the municipal tax base constitutes a cognizable injury-in-fact for 
standing purposes.  One of the earliest instances of a city suing on this basis 
occurred in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.
106
  In this case, the 
Village commenced an action against local realtors under Title VIII of the 
FHA, alleging that the town suffered economic harm by “having [its] 
housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the economic 
and social detriment of the citizens of [the] village . . . .”
107
  The defendant-
realtors moved to dismiss, arguing “that respondents had ‘no actionable 
claim or standing to sue’ under the statutes relied upon in the 
complaint . . . .”
108
  Justice Powell reasoned that a “significant reduction in 
property values directly injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base, 
thus threatening its ability to bear the costs of local government and to 
provide services.”
109
  The Gladstone majority concluded that the village 
had alleged facts sufficient to provide Article III standing.
110
  The Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly reinforced the intuition 
 
 104.  City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 105.  City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48522, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011). 
 106.  444 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 107.  Id. at 95. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 110-11; see also id. at 115 (“[C]onvincing evidence that the economic value 
of one’s own home has declined as a result of the conduct of another certainly is sufficient 
under Art. III to allow standing to contest the legality of that conduct.”). 
 110.  Id. at 115. 
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that economic harm is a cognizable injury-in-fact in a number of cases.
111
  
More specifically, conduct producing a drain on the plaintiff-organization’s 
finite financial resources can imbue standing to sue in federal court.
112
  At 
least one court of appeals has elected to extend this principle to actions 
under the FHA.
113
 
Given the abundant case law on the subject, it is uncontroversial to 
posit that cities can successfully and easily allege cognizable injuries-in-
fact in the form of diminished property tax bases, along with increased 
expenditures on public welfare programs as a result of mass displacement 
of minority communities in urban areas.  The “fairly traceable” element is 
where the fundamental and incurable defect in the cities’ FHA complaints 
arises. 
 
D. Injury “Fairly Traceable” to the Defendant’s Conduct 
 
 
 111.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (clarifying that “the 
interest alleged to have been injured ‘may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
as well as economic values’”) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)), superseded by statute, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as recognized in Fairview Twp. v. 
EPA, 773 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 1985); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 
2011) (agreeing with plaintiffs that purchases of homes at inflated prices were “actual and 
concrete economic injuries”); Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 
F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing previous statements that pecuniary injury 
creates sufficient basis for standing); City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“[E]conomic . . . harms constitute injury to Sausalito’s ‘proprietary’ interests as 
a municipal entity.”); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (“Economic injury is clearly a sufficient basis for standing.”). 
 112.  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that racial 
steering practices which impaired an organization’s ability to assist low-income home-
seekers drained the organization’s financial resources, producing cognizable injury-in-fact 
and giving the organization standing in its own right); Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., 573 
F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing because 
“plaintiff’s statement [that] they have expended resources on counteracting defendants’ 
policies are sufficient to state an injury in fact caused by defendant’s conduct”).  In the tort 
law context, then-Judge Kennedy adopted the position that expenses associated with the 
provision of police and fire services are “to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed 
against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the service.”  City of Flagstaff 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983).  However, no other 
federal court seems to have assumed this posture toward municipal expenditures since. 
 113.  Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Expenditures to 
reach out to potential home buyers or renters [injured by discriminatory advertising] . . . are 
sufficiently tangible to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”); Nat’l Fair Hous. 
Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 54 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he Fair 
Housing Group plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact caused by defendant’s 
conduct, [because the] . . . injury lies in their expenditure of scarce resources on identifying 
and counteracting discrimination.”). 
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However, alleging the infliction of some tangible injury-in-fact is 
insufficient to successfully allege Article III standing.  Plaintiffs must also 
allege facts that show “a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘ fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”
114
  It is the 
second element of the constitutional standing analysis that comprises the 
crux of my analysis.  Here, I argue that the district courts which have 
concluded that Baltimore’s and Memphis’ complaints alleged conduct 
fairly traceable to the lenders’ conduct fail to apply decades of Supreme 
Court precedent on this issue.  I start with a brief discussion of what the 
standing inquiry demands from those plaintiffs who were not the direct 
victims of the defendants’ conduct.  Next, I illustrate the structural 
infirmities in the cities’ complaints by drawing comparisons to the illegal 
handgun and tobacco litigation of the late twentieth century, along with 
more recent private actions instituted by borrowers purportedly duped into 
purchasing residential properties at inflated prices by homebuilders. 
E. Harm As an Indirect Result of Defendant’s Conduct 
Where the harm to plaintiff resulted as an indirect consequence of the 
defendant’s conduct, which “does not in itself preclude standing.”
115
  
However, satisfying the “fairly traceable” element of standing may become 
much more difficult when “the plaintiff is not himself the object of the 
[defendant’s] action or inaction he challenges.”
116
  The indirectness of the 
 
 114.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 
 115.  Hope, Inc. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797, 807 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)).  It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to maintain actions 
in federal court despite suffering harms entirely collateral to a more direct victim of the 
defendant’s actions.  See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472-77 (1987) (holding that 
plaintiff has standing to challenge Justice Department’s designation of films as propaganda, 
given that it would damage his public reputation and make it more difficult to run for 
office); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973) (finding that environmental group had standing to challenge 
Interstate Commerce Commission over rate increase expected to decrease recycling, which 
in turn would impact forests and streams enjoyed by plaintiffs). 
 116.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 45 (recognizing that 
indirectness of injury makes it more difficult to show that “the asserted injury was the 
consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm”); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (“[I]ndirectness of the injury does not necessarily deprive the person 
harmed of standing to vindicate his rights . . . .  But it may make it substantially more 
difficult . . . to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the 
defendants’ actions . . . .”). 
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harm does not absolve the plaintiff from alleging “facts establishing that all 
links in the causal chain are satisfied.”
117
  Any missing link in the causal 
chain, or severing of that connection due to some third party’s intervention, 
will likely result in a finding by the court that the plaintiff is not the proper 
party to bring suit against the defendant.
118
 
While the “fairly traceable” requirement demands some connection 
between the plaintiff’s harm and defendant’s conduct, the causal link does 
not need to be articulated with such scientific precision that the complaint 
is Twombly-Iqbal proof.
119
  However, to avoid the evisceration of that 
element and to avert dilution of the standing doctrine that prevents courts 
from being transformed into vehicles for the promotion of litigants’ value 
judgments, overly attenuated theories of liability will not survive motions 
to dismiss for lack of standing.  Before I turn to the immediate FHA 
litigation, I describe in some detail the handgun and tobacco litigation of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, to provide context for my argument that 
cities lack constitutional standing to sue under the FHA. 
F. Past Is Prologue: Other State- and City-Sponsored Attempts at 
Seeking Judicial Remedies to Combat Mass Social Ills 
The ongoing foreclosure crisis is not the first urban epidemic that has 
triggered a flight to the courts.  In the late twentieth century, cities were 
overwhelmed by a deluge of illegal firearms and the inevitable gun 
violence accompanying it.  In response, they sued several prominent gun 
makers in an attempt to find monetary compensation for the bloodshed 
enabled by Beretta, Smith & Wesson and others.  Similarly, state and local 
pension funds, staring down the prospect of insolvency as their 
beneficiaries developed a laundry list of costly-to-treat smoking-related 
diseases, instituted litigation against Phillip Morris and other purveyors of 
nicotine products to seek damages for higher medical costs.  In both 
episodes, the federal courts generally dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for lack 
 
 117.  Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 118.  See id. (finding a “missing link”  in the chain of events causing plaintiffs’ injuries 
when affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of standing). 
 119.  Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
72 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the “fairly traceable” requirement “does not mean that 
plaintiffs must show to a scientific certainty” that defendant’s behavior “caused the precise 
harm suffered by the plaintiffs . . . . The ‘fairly traceable’ requirement . . . is not equivalent 
to a requirement of tort causation.”).  Admittedly, the “fairly traceable” step of the standing 
inquiry bears more than a passing resemblance to the concept of proximate causation in tort.  
Both demand some showing of a substantial causal link between the defendant’s conduct 
and plaintiff’s harm.  But it is important to remain clear that standing is a jurisdictional 
inquiry, where the issue of proximate causation addresses the merits of the tort claim. 
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of standing, due to highly attenuated causal theories.  The factual 
resemblance between the handgun and tobacco litigation and the present 
FHA actions is imperfect but substantial.  Relying on the analytical 
framework espoused by the courts in those cases, I extend it to the present 
cases to argue that the cities lack Article III standing to sue under the FHA. 
i. Tobacco Litigation 
“When smokers changed to Philip Morris, every case of irritation of 
nose or throat—due to smoking—either cleared up completely or definitely 
improved!  That is from the findings of distinguished doctors in clinical 
tests of actual smokers – reported in an authoritative medical journal.”
120
 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a cluster of civil RICO actions 
arrived in the federal courts, targeting the major tobacco companies, 
particularly Philip Morris.
121
  The primary agitators were pension funds and 
medical providers faced with large and increasing medical outlays due to 
beneficiaries’ smoking-related illnesses. 
The theory of liability typically went as follows:  In the 1950s, 
scientific studies arose, which found an indisputable link between smoking 
and various health risks.
122
  In response, the defendant tobacco companies 
embarked on a public relations blitzkrieg to persuade a credulous public 
that the tobacco industry would research the possible links between 
smoking and poor health, and disclose the results.
123
  “Defendants, 
however, entered into a conspiracy to do just the opposite.”
124
  The tobacco 
companies purportedly went one step further, and agreed to also “forgo 
development of safer tobacco products.”
125
  As a result of the tobacco 
companies’ alleged suppression of the scientific studies, the pension funds 
 
 120.  Johnny Calls for Philip Morris, STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF 
TOBACCO ADVER., http://med.stanford.edu/ohns/tobacco_ads/images/for_your_throat/heres_ 
johnny/large/morris_01.jpg (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
 121.  See, e.g., SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Pa. 
1999), aff’d, 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000); Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d; Or. Laborers-
Emp’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Conn. Pipe Trades Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Conn. 2001); 
Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (W.D. Wash. 
1999); Ark. Carpenters’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936 
(E.D. Ark. 1999); Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2003); Coyne v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 122.  Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 961. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
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were blocked from receiving accurate information about the true dangers of 
smoking.
126
  Were the pension funds able to access the scientific studies, so 
the theory goes, they would have taken action “to reduce smoking rates 
among their participants.  This reduction in smoking rates would have led 
to a reduction in smoking-related disease among the funds’ participants 
which would have in turn led to lowering plaintiffs’ expenditures.”
127
  As to 
damages, the funds and providers alleged they were entitled to “monies 
spent to reimburse [their] participants for their medical care due to smoking 
related illnesses.”
128
 
Like the mortgage lenders in the municipalities’ now-pending FHA 
actions, the tobacco companies pounced on the providers’ and pension 
funds’ derivative theory of liability, pointing to the attenuated causal links 
between the beneficiaries’ smoking and subsequent uptick in plaintiffs’ 
medical expenses years later.
129
  And like the current FHA actions, the 
federal courts were receptive to that argument.  By and large, the funds’ 
and providers’ RICO complaints were dismissed due to proximate 
causation and/or standing problems.
130
  The federal courts used a three-
factor remoteness test for RICO actions from Holmes v. Security Investor 
Protection Corp. to gauge the plaintiffs’ standing: 
(1) [W]hether there are more direct victims of the alleged 
wrongful conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as 
private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to 
ascertain the amount of plaintiff’s damages attributable to 
defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will 
have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate 
the risk of multiple recoveries.
131
 
 
 126.  Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 962. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  R.I. Laborers’, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
 129.  See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 
239 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing defendants’ argument that because “plaintiffs’ alleged 
injuries . . . flow from the misfortunes visited upon third persons . . . plaintiffs therefore 
stand at too remote a distance to recover”); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 
F. Supp. 2d 610,612 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (registering defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s 
“injuries are too remote as a matter of law for them to have standing to sue the 
Defendants”), aff’d, 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 130.  See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (listing cases 
from eight different circuits to show that “other federal circuit courts . . . uniformly have 
concluded that such claims must fail because the alleged injuries are too remote”); R.I. 
Laborers, 99 F. Supp. at 182-83 (referencing “at least eleven federal district courts and three 
circuit courts . . . that concluded that those claims should be dismissed on grounds of 
proximate cause and/or standing”). 
 131.  Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 963.  Other federal courts followed in the footsteps of 
Or. Laborers, using the same test from Holmes.  See SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Phillip 
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Regarding the first “direct victim” element of the Holmes test, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the smokers, as “more direct victims of the alleged 
wrongful conduct and who can be counted on to vindicate the injury caused 
by defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct, weighs heavily in favor of 
barring plaintiffs’ actions.”
132
  By the plaintiffs’ own theories of liability, 
the funds’ and hospitals’ claims were “derivative of the injuries suffered by 
the smoker patients.”
133
  For the spike in tobacco-related medical costs to 
impact the providers and pension funds, an injury to smokers must first 
have occurred before the plaintiffs could incur increased expenses to pay 
for those smokers’ medical costs.
134
  Even ignoring the secondhand nature 
of the funds’ injuries and conceding the existence of a sinister tobacco 
conspiracy, “the agency of the individual smokers in deciding whether, and 
how frequently, to smoke” was the ultimate determinant of the funds’ 
ultimate medical expenditures.
135
  In contrast, “there are injured persons, 
i.e., the smokers, capable and motivated to bring suit, thus ‘promot[ing] the 
general interest in deterring injurious conduct.’”
136
  The circuit courts 
seized on this lengthy causal chain to conclude that “[t]here is therefore no 
direct link between the alleged misconduct of the tobacco companies and 
 
Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that “harms alleged by the 
funds and nations are too remote from the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing to provide 
antitrust or RICO standing”); Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 236-37 (applying same test 
drawn from Holmes for standing in RICO actions); R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 185-87 
(using the Holmes factors to evaluate a motion to dismiss); see also Ark. Carpenters’ Health 
& Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936, 942 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (following 
Or. Laborers in applying the three-pronged Holmes test for standing in tobacco RICO and 
antitrust actions). 
 132.  Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964.  But see Ark. Carpenters, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 943 
(reciting the Or. Laborers Court’s use of the Holmes test to decide “that the RICO and 
antitrust claims in the case at bar should be dismissed as well”). 
 133.  Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 
(W.D. Wash. 1999); see Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239 (explaining that damages “are 
entirely derivative of the harm suffered by plan participants as a result of using tobacco 
products,”  deciding that the injuries were indirect and “purely contingent on harm to third 
parties”  and noting that the plaintiffs would have to prove “(1) the effect any smoking 
cessation programs or incentives would have had on the number of smokers among the plan 
beneficiaries; (2) the countereffect that the tobacco companies’ direct fraud would have had 
on the smokers . . . and (3) other reasons why individual smokers would continue smoking” 
); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992) (stating that “a 
plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third 
person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to 
recover” ); Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 116 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (concluding that “to the extent that 
the Plaintiffs’ claims are based simply on indirect cost increases from smoking-related 
injuries, said injuries are not ‘direct’” ). 
 134.  Ass’n of Wash., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 135.  Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240. 
 136.  R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. at 185. 
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the claimed damage to plaintiffs.”
137
 
The difficulty in estimating the damages caused by the tobacco 
companies’ alleged conspiracy also proved fatal to the providers’ and 
funds’ complaints, per the second Holmes element.  “[C]onsiderable 
speculation would be involved in identifying the costs that have caused the 
alleged financial instability of the funds . . . .”
138
  As noted in SEIU, “it is 
difficult to know how smokers might have behaved with more complete 
information . . . .”
139
  Even when the plaintiffs offered statistical analysis to 
quantify the precise harms resulting from the tobacco companies’ purported 
campaign of deception, “the speculative nature of the claimed damages” 
remained an obstacle to any finding of standing to maintain a RICO 
action.
140
  The Laborers Local 17 Court pointedly observed that this species 
of lawsuit “seems to present precisely the type of large, complicated 
damage claims that Holmes . . . sought to avoid.”
141
  Judge Janet Arterton, 
in the District of Connecticut, cited to Holmes for the proposition that “the 
more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine the 
amount of plaintiff’s damages attributable to the wrongdoing as opposed to 
other, independent factors.”
142
  The high number of separate behavioral 
decisions independently made by each smoker combined with the prospect 
of endless counterfactuals about cancer-free union workers necessary to put 
a dollar figure on the damages claims led most courts to throw up their 
hands in exasperation, resolving the second Holmes element in favor of the 
tobacco companies.
143
 
The secondhand nature of the harms sustained by the pension funds 
fed into the third element of the Holmes inquiry, which also militated 
against a finding of standing for the funds and providers.  The possibility 
that the smokers themselves could sue the tobacco companies (though not 
 
 137.  Ass’n of Wash., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (quoting Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964). 
 138.  SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1074 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240. 
 142.  Conn. Pipe Trades Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D. 
Conn. 2001) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70). 
 143.  See R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 
174, 178 (D.R.I. 2000) (noting the difficulty of predicting damages with any specificity 
because “ascertaining damages would require layers of hypothetical models speculating as 
to the actions of the Fund, the smokers, and the interplay between the actions of both”); 
Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1224 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999) (considering “how many smokers would have stopped smoking with more 
information, how many would have smoked less dangerous products, how much healthier 
these hypothetical reformed smokers would have been, and how much less unreimbursed 
care and services would have been incurred by the plaintiffs”). 
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under state or federal RICO statutes) counseled against finding that the 
pension funds had standing, because “the courts would be forced ‘to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs at different levels 
of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple 
recoveries.’”
144
  Individual plaintiffs targeting the tobacco companies with 
civil suits sought “the same recovery as the Fund[s], i.e., their medical 
expenses, among their other claims for damages.”
145
  The Laborers Local 
17 Court noted that under New York law, “the smokers are prohibited from 
recovering medical costs paid to them by insurers.”
146
  Nonetheless, the 
potential for litigious employers to also go after the tobacco companies, 
combined with the headaches produced by federal ERISA law and the 
single satisfaction rule, lead that court to find that Holmes’ third prong 
pointed toward granting the companies’ motions to dismiss.  Similarly, the 
Rhode Island Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund Court perceived the risk of 
double recoveries to be too great.  Rhode Island’s collateral source rule 
meant that a plaintiff’s damages could not be reduced to the extent 
plaintiffs had received prior reimbursement for medical expenses.
147
  
Combined with the risk of employer-instituted litigation to retrieve 
increased health insurance contributions, that court also held that Holmes 
commanded the dismissal of the suit.
148
 
At least two circuit courts in the tobacco litigation also relied on a six-
part test articulated in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State 
Council of Carpenters, to assess the funds’ and providers’ antitrust 
claims:
149
 
(1) [T]he casual connection between defendant’s wrongdoing and 
plaintiff’s harm; (2) the specific intent of defendant to harm 
plaintiff; (3) the nature of plaintiff’s alleged injury (and whether 
 
 144.  Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 
F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269); see also SEIU, 249 F.3d at 
1075 (determining that plaintiff failed the “risk of double recovery” element of the Holmes 
test because “individual smokers may seek recoveries for the same alleged conduct under 
state law theories and . . . other similar potential plaintiffs might also pursue similar antitrust 
and RICO claims against the tobacco industry, double recovery could occur”). 
 145.  R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
 146.  Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240. 
 147.  R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
 148.  Id. at 190. 
 149.  Like many of the other cases referenced in this Comment, Associated General’s 
test blurs the line between the tort element of proximate causation and constitutional 
standing.  See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting that Associated General “outlined six factors for determining proximate cause and 
standing”); see also Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 
F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999) (summarizing application of Associated General six-part test 
to determine that funds lack standing to pursue antitrust claims against tobacco companies). 
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it relates to the purposes of the antitrust laws, i.e., ensuring 
competition within economic markets); (4) “the directness or 
indirectness of the asserted injury”; (5) whether the “damages 
claim is . . . highly speculative”; and (6) “keeping the scope of 
complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits,” i.e., 
“avoiding either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one hand, 
or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the 
other.”
150
 
Although this test has more parts than the one in Holmes, the inquiry 
is essentially the same, albeit dealing with an antitrust action.  Within the 
context of the Associated General test, the Allegheny Court came out the 
same way, despite resolving several of the elements of the antitrust test in 
favor of plaintiff-hospitals.  The Third Circuit conceded that the alleged 
conspiracy to mask the health risks of smoking would form a but-for causal 
connection between the tobacco companies and the medical providers’ 
injuries, that the tobacco companies’ conspiracy was borne out of a desire 
to “shift the costs of the nonpaying patients’ tobacco-related illnesses to the 
Hospitals,” and that the hospitals’ claims were of the general type intended 
to be remedied by federal antitrust laws.
151
  Furthermore, the court, in 
affirming the district court on its determination that “the Hospitals seem 
like the appropriate party,” acknowledged that “nonpaying patients in the 
present case, while more directly injured, may be unwilling to sue the 
Tobacco Companies for antitrust violations.”
152
 
Yet like those courts, which opted to apply the Holmes test, the 
plaintiff-hospitals stumbled over the “directness of injury” hurdle.  The 
Third Circuit noted that the hospitals’ injuries were entirely derivative of 
nonpaying patients’ injuries.
153
  As a result, those harms were “too remotely 
connected in the causal chain from wrongdoing on the part of Tobacco 
Companies; thus, the Hospitals’ injuries do not satisfy the directness of 
 
 150.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 438 (quoting Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 924). 
 151.  Id. at 439; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929-30 (noting a genuine causal 
connection “between the conduct of the tobacco companies and the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff Funds” and finding that plaintiffs successfully alleged that defendants’ conspiracy 
specifically targeted them and admitting that plaintiffs’ “inability to obtain and use 
information on the dangers of smoking or on smoking-cessation methods–may be of the 
type that the antitrust laws are intended to prevent”). 
 152.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 440; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930 (recognizing 
unlikelihood that smokers would bring their own antitrust claims). 
 153.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 440; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930 (stating that the 
“sheer number of links in the chain of causation that connect the defendants’ suppression of 
information on the dangers of their products . . . to the Funds’ increased expenditures are 
greater than in any case we can find in which this court or the Supreme Court has found 
antitrust standing”). 
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injury factor.”
154
  The court found that the high number of links in the 
causal chain created “vast uncertainty about the Hospitals’ damages.”
155
  
The Allegheny Court, skeptical of the ability of statistical modeling to 
estimate damages, determined that any damages would be highly 
speculative.
156
 
Ultimately, the Associated General test incorporated a number of 
factors that militated in favor of finding that the plaintiff-hospitals had 
standing to sue under the antitrust laws.  However, those factors were 
“outweighed . . . by the sheer remoteness of the Hospitals’ injuries from the 
alleged conspiracy,” which in turn manifested itself in “the highly 
speculative nature of the Hospitals’ damages claims . . . [and] in the 
directness of the Hospitals’ injuries.”
157
 
 
ii. Handgun Litigation 
 
“Introducing the Beretta Model 86, the only .380 automatic pistol 
with a tip-up barrel for easy and rapid loading . . . . If you’re considering a 
handgun for personal protection, here’s one that offers it all.”
158
 
 
Like the tobacco companies, handgun makers were also caught in the 
torrential downpour of state and local government-sponsored litigation in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  From 2000 to 2003, 
several municipalities filed civil complaints in state and federal court 
against various gun makers, relying on state product liability statutes and 
common law claims of public nuisance.
159
  Unlike the tobacco litigation, 
 
 154.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 441; see also Steamfitters 171 F.3d at 925 (doubting 
“whether there exists a causal connection (proximate or otherwise) between any antitrust 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants and the Funds’ alleged injuries of increased health 
care expenditures”). 
 155.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 441; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929-30 (noting that 
calculating damages through statistical models can be more difficult than proponents 
suggest). 
 156.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 433; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929 (“It is apparent 
why the Funds argue they can demonstrate all of this through aggregation and statistical 
modeling:  it would be impossible for them to do so otherwise.”). 
 157.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 443. 
 158.  Women and Guns, VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY, http://www.womenand 
guns.vcu.edu (last visited Dec. 6, 2012). 
 159.  See, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. 
Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000); White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. 
Ohio 2000); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); City of Boston v. 
Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 352 (July 13, 
2000); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); City of 
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). 
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which culminated in an ugly wave of dismissals for lack of standing, 
several of the cities’ lawsuits against the handgun manufacturers survived 
the motion to dismiss stage.
160
 
In this batch of cases, the cities typically alleged that the gun makers 
“created a nuisance through their ongoing conduct of marketing, 
distributing, and selling firearms in a manner that facilitated their flow into 
the illegal market.”
161
  It was the gun makers’ alleged knowing support for 
the illegal secondary firearms market that created the nuisance causing the 
municipalities’ injuries, not the use of the guns themselves.
162
  On the 
product liability side, the cities also alleged negligently defective design of 
the handguns, failure to include adequate safety warnings or features that 
would inhibit unlawful access or transfer by unauthorized handgun users.
163
  
Like the tobacco companies, the gun makers focused on the cities’ highly 
attenuated theory of liability to attack their standing to pursue these state 
law claims. 
Importantly for the purposes of this Comment, the municipalities filed 
direct suits—not on behalf of resident taxpayers, but in their own capacities 
as private litigants.
164
  The cities’ claims were “not based on the rights of 
others, but rather the rights of the City to sue for the harm and economic 
losses it ha[d] incurred, as well as their claims of unjust enrichment and 
 
 160.  Compare Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. at 245 (granting 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
for lack of standing), and District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 847 A.2d 1127 
(D.C. 2004) (affirming trial court’s decision that plaintiff has not stated a public nuisance 
claim), and In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 663 (Ct. App. 2005) (affirming grant 
of summary judgment for defendant gunmakers due to plaintiffs’ failure to establish causal 
connection between unfair practices and harm), and Ganim, 780 A.2d 98 (affirming 
dismissal for lack of standing), and City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 
1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (reversing appellate court and dismissing city’s public nuisance 
complaint), and New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194-195 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2003) (affirming motion court’s dismissal of state’s complaint due to proximate 
causation issues), with White, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (denying gun makers’ 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss), and City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1249 (Ind. 2004) 
(holding that city may proceed with its public nuisance claim), and City of Boston, 2000 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing), and James, 820 
A.2d 27 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss); and City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d 1136 
(reversing and finding that city had standing to pursue its product liability and nuisance 
claims). 
 161.  City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143; see also City of Boston, 2000 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 352 at *7-8 (offering additional arguments in the handguns line of cases). 
 162.  Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 250-52 (summarizing plaintiff’s claims that 
“defendants allegedly produce, market and distribute substantially more handguns than they 
reasonably expect to sell to law-abiding purchasers”). 
 163.  Ganim, 780 A.2d at 108; City of Boston, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 at *9-10; 
James, 820 A.2d at 34; City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1145. 
 164.  Ganim, 780 A.2d at 117-18; James, 820 A.2d at 45; White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
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nuisance abatement.”
165
 
Addressing the threshold jurisdictional issue of standing, the courts 
generally concluded that the fiscal costs of weathering the violent crime 
induced by an influx of illegal handguns constituted an injury-in-fact.  The 
Cincinnati court separated the economic losses sustained by the city into 
two parts: the increased expenses of remedying violent crime and reduced 
tax receipts arising from lowered property values.
166
  Both the Cincinnati 
and Camden courts took care to note that the alleged injuries were distinct 
from those of city taxpayers.
167
  In particular, “the County’s alleged injury 
is distinguishable from that of its citizens,” because “[t]he alleged costs of 
combating illegal gun possession do not flow solely from harm visited 
upon a third party; they are alleged to exist as a result of separate and direct 
harm defendants have visited upon the County itself.”
168
  Thus, Cincinnati 
and Camden County successfully alleged a cognizable injury-in-fact, 
surmounting the first hurdle in the standing inquiry.
169
 
The Cincinnati Court applied the Holmes test to conclude that the City 
itself had standing to pursue its claims against the gun makers.  Ignoring 
any analysis that actually focused on whether the City’s fiscal damages 
were “fairly traceable” to the defendant-gun makers’ conduct, the Ohio 
Supreme Court examined only the difficulty of proving damages, the 
probability of double recovery by both the City and some other 
hypothetical plaintiff and whether requiring more directly injured victims 
to bring suit would better serve the interest of deterring gun makers’ 
harmful conduct.  Notably, this logic is devoid of any scrutiny of 
Cincinnati’s theory of liability.  Nothing in the majority opinion speaks to 
whether the gun makers’ conduct could fairly be seen to have resulted in 
the City’s harms.  Chief Justice Moyer in dissent did not overlook this 
gaping hole in the majority’s analysis.  Relying on Ganim, he recited the 
numerous links in the causal chain required to connect the gun makers’ 
conduct and Cincinnati’s harms: 
[M]anufacturers sell handguns to distributors or wholesalers . . . .  
Next, retailers sell the guns legally either to authorized buyers, 
i.e., legitimate consumers, or to unauthorized buyers . . . .  Next, 
the illegally acquired guns enter a black market, eventually 
finding their way to unauthorized users.  At this point, either 
authorized buyers misuse the handguns by not taking proper 
 
 165.  White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825.  E.g., Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (suing to 
recover “the institutional costs of combating the flow of illegal handguns into the County”). 
 166.  City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1148. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 256. 
 169.  Id. 
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storage or other unwarned or uninstructed precautions, or 
unauthorized buyers misuse the guns to commit crimes or other 
harmful acts.  The city then incurs expenses for various 
municipal necessities, including crime investigation, emergency 
and other medical services for the injured, or similar expenses.  
Finally, the city may suffer financial consequences, including 
increased costs for municipal services . . . [and] reduced property 
values . . . .
170
 
Drawing on comparisons between the present appeal and Ganim, 
along with the ill-fated tobacco litigation, the dissent found “the number of 
links in this factual chain was in and of itself strongly suggestive of 
remoteness.”
171
  Chief Justice Moyer was careful to separate the question of 
whether the city could prove that it sustained some cognizable injury from 
whether the city could show “that those damages are attributable to the 
wrongdoing of the gun manufacturers as opposed to other, independent 
factors.”
172
  Similarly, the White Court reduced the “fairly traceable” 
component to a paragraph.  While concluding that the City of Cleveland 
alleged “a causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ injuries and the 
conduct complained of,” it declined to clarify its ruling that the City had 
pleaded sufficient facts to satisfy the second component of the standing 
inquiry.
173
  Despite acknowledging that a finding of standing would be 
weakened considerably, were the City’s injuries “the result of the 
independent action of some third party,” the district court allowed the suit 
to proceed as having successfully invoked federal jurisdiction.
174
  Likewise, 
the Arms Technology Court reduced the standing test to a one-stage inquiry 
into the nature of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
175
  The bulk of the 
analysis concentrated on the merits of the City of Newark’s tort action and 
the issue of proximate causation.  The New Jersey court extended the 
application of Associated General Contractor’s remoteness analysis in the 
antitrust context to the immediate case.  It acknowledged “the fact that 
there may be . . . multiple links between defendants’ conduct and the 
ultimate harm suffered by the City . . . .”
176
  Nonetheless, the court opted to 
“fold into a single link” the numerous steps in the City’s theory of 
 
 170.  City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1152-53 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 98 (Conn. 2001)). 
 171.  Id. at 1153 (quoting Ganim, 780 A.2d at 98). 
 172.  Id. at 1154 (emphasis added) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 269 (1992)). 
 173.  White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  James v. Arms Tech. Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 44-46 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 176.  Id. at 39. 
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liability.
177
  Turning to Holmes, the court quickly determined that the harms 
suffered by the City as a consequence of any alleged flooding of local 
markets with cheap handguns were not too derivative of harms suffered by 
victimized taxpayers.
178
  It concluded by distinguishing Holmes from the 
case before it, stating that policy reasons justified allowing the City to 
reach discovery in order to establish that its damages were attributable to 
the defendants.
179
 
For those cities whose complaints did not survive the gun makers’ 
motions to dismiss, the “fairly traceable” element of standing proved to be 
the plaintiffs’ downfall.  Drawing on the six-part test for proximate 
causation in Associated General Contractors, the Camden County Court 
determined that of the six Associated General factors for standing in an 
antitrust suit, only the “causal connection” and “general aims advanced” 
factors were satisfied.
180
  While allegations of an extremely attenuated 
causal connection linked the gun companies’ conduct to the County’s 
harms, and allowing the County to maintain its tort action would have 
advanced “the general aims of New Jersey tort law,” the “sheer 
remoteness” of the alleged injuries overcame all else.
181
  The highly 
attenuated causal theory combined with the highly speculative nature of 
damages to create a jurist’s nightmare in producing a dollar figure for a 
damages award and apportioning it among multiple defendants.
182
 
iii. Private Homeowners’ Actions Against Homebuilders 
In 2008, seven separate class actions hit the Central District of 
California, along with two class actions filed in the District of South 
Carolina and Western District of North Carolina.
183
  Plaintiffs’ theories of 
 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 53. 
 179.  Id. at 42-43. 
 180.  Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 
245, 264 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Dodaro v. Std. Pac. Corp., No. EDCV 09-01666-VAP (OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01674 VAP(DTBx), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 
1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Lumalu v. M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01669 VAP(OPx), 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44797 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex 
Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 
VAP(OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex 
Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Nielson v. Shea Homes, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01673 
VAP(DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. 
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liability in each case were largely identical:  Defendant homebuilders 
duped them into buying residential properties in ostensibly stable and 
family-oriented communities.  The homebuilders represented to the 
plaintiff-buyers that they were selling homes to buyers who had the 
financial means to afford the houses and who would be good neighbors.
184
  
Meanwhile, the defendants marketed unsold houses in the same 
communities to unqualified and high-foreclosure-risk buyers and to those 
who possessed no intent of occupying the properties to increase sales and 
profits per housing unit sold.
185
  Defendants purportedly were aware that 
this could have significant negative consequences on the overall 
desirability of living and owning properties in these residential 
neighborhoods.
186
  The harms alleged were twofold.  First, plaintiffs 
claimed that they bought into the housing market at an inflated price, 
thanks to defendants’ machinations to artificially boost the local real estate 
market and willful failure to disclose the true nature of the high-risk 
buyers.
187
  Second, once the housing bubble deflated and unqualified 
buyers in the neighborhood defaulted en masse, subsequent foreclosure 
proceedings wiped out the accrued value in plaintiffs’ residences and 
sparked development of suburban blight in plaintiffs’ neighborhoods.
188
 
In granting the homebuilder’s 12(b)(1) motion, the Beazer Court 
pointed to the innumerable intervening factors that could potentially have 
driven the jump in foreclosures that reduced the fair market value of 
plaintiffs’ real estate holdings: 
[I]t does not necessarily follow from this allegation that these 
third party home buyers subsequently defaulted on their 
mortgages due to the Defendants’ conduct rather than those 
buyers having failed to make their mortgage payments as a result 
of other factors, such as unemployment, health problems, a 
general weakening in the economy, or other financial conditions.  
In addition to the failure of these mortgagors to make their 
 
Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Oneto v. Ryland Grp., Inc. No. EDCV 09-
01670 VAP(DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44792 (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by 
Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Stephens v. Lennar Corp., No. EDCV 
09-01668 VAP (DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32111 (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled 
by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).  See also Tingley v. Beazer Homes 
Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (dismissing 
class action brought against homebuilders); Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-109-
CMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66887 (D.S.C., Sept. 10, 2007) (dismissing a class action 
brought against homebuilders). 
 184.  Dodaro, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136 at *4. 
 185.  Id. at *4-5. 
 186.  Id. at *5. 
 187.  Id. at *6. 
 188.  Id. 
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payments, there is the issue of the intervening decisions by the 
mortgage assignees to foreclose the defaulted mortgages rather 
than to restructure the loans, which may have been done for 
reasons totally apart from the alleged fraud.  Further, it is quite 
speculative that the depreciation in value of the Plaintiffs’ 
property was caused by the foreclosures of these third party 
properties rather than as a result of a myriad of other factors, such 
as rising unemployment in the region, changes in the housing 
market, or other economic conditions.  It is just as plausible that 
any of these other factors caused any reduction in the Plaintiffs’ 
property value.
189
 
Judge Virginia Phillips, granting the homebuilders’ 12(b)(1) motions 
with respect to all seven class actions in the Central District, drew on 
Beazer’s rationale to determine that the beleaguered homeowners’ 
pleadings satisfied neither the injury-in-fact nor the fairly-traceable prongs 
of the standing test.  One of the incurable flaws in their complaints, she 
reasoned, was that “[p]laintiff’s theory is premised upon a chain of 
causation that is affected by general economic factors,” including “collapse 
of financial institutions, changes in the credit market, and rising 
unemployment, which by themselves or in combination affect the housing 
market.”
190
  Each of these factors comprised “independent forces and 
individual decisions of ‘some third part[ies] not before the court.’”
191
  
Similarly, the Green Court dismissed plaintiff’s RICO claims on a 12(b)(1) 
motion due to “difficulties as to the second (causation) and third 
(redressability) prongs.”
192
  Noting that “the alleged wrongs relate to 
actions directed toward other homeowners or their lenders,” the court found 
that, the plaintiff, having “at most, suffered collateral injury as a result of a 
generalized market impact of wrongs directed toward others” was 
insufficient to confer Article III standing.
193
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Central District of California 
 
 189.  Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303, at 
*11-12 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 190.  Dodaro, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136, at *27-28. 
 191.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560-61 (1992)). 
 192.  Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-1098-CMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
66887, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2007). 
 193.  Id.  Concededly, Beazer’s analysis was performed in the context of Twombly/Iqbal 
“plausibility” scrutiny for a 12(b)(6) motion, rather than a less-stringent mode of analysis.  
As I argued earlier, demanding a certain level of plausibility or factual particularity from the 
plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(1) motion gets the standard of review for Article III standing 
wrong.  However, there remains an important kernel of truth in the district court’s analysis: 
Far too many external forces operate upon the housing market at the same time for a court to 
competently parse the direction and magnitude of the impact on house prices. 
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with respect to the grant of the 12(b)(1) motions for the seven class actions, 
choosing to find that although “plaintiffs have not established how 
defendants actions’ necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’ 
complaints allege that the decreased value is caused by the risk posed by 
their neighbors (even absent foreclosures),” they deserved permission to 
amend their complaint to cure the causal defects blocking a proper finding 
of Article III standing.
194
  The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court, 
in order to allow the plaintiffs to include expert testimony that could 
establish a sufficient link between the homebuilders’ actions and decreased 
home value.  This constituted an explicit recognition of the fundamental 
defect in the private homeowners’ theory of liability. 
IV. WHY CITIES LACK ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE 
FHA 
The municipality-sponsored FHA litigation that is the impetus for this 
Comment should be uniformly dismissed for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  First, the judicially formulated tests for statutory standing in 
the antitrust and RICO contexts should be imported into the Article III 
“fairly traceable” test when facing FHA actions alleging economic losses.  
Those multipronged inquiries were formed to determine whether the 
plaintiff, suffering pecuniary harms arising from a series of interconnected 
events, is the proper party to commence litigation.  Although this would 
necessitate an insertion of common law from antitrust and RICO litigation 
into the FHA context, it is appropriate here, given the daisy chain theory of 
liability relied on by the cities in their claims arising from wholly pecuniary 
harms inflicted by the defendant-lenders.  The courts resolving the handgun 
and tobacco litigation opted to apply the antitrust and RICO causation tests 
in their own analyses for proximate causation and constitutional 
standing.
195
  The application of those tests militates toward a finding that 
 
 194.  Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 195.  See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 121 (Conn. 2001) 
(applying the standing analysis used by Second Circuit in Laborers Local 17 and Holmes); 
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, 
at *17 (Mass. July 13, 2000) (explaining and applying the Holmes direct injury test); 
Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 n.8 
(D.N.J. 2000) (describing the Associated General test as not appropriate in all causation 
analyses but “useful in this particular case alleging economic harm due to the actions or 
omissions of remote actors in the marketplace”); see also Laborers Local 17 Health & 
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the Associated 
General six-factor test to grant a motion to dismiss).  The Ameriquest Court took note of the 
City of Cincinnati Court’s use of Holmes in the firearms litigation context and extended it to 
the proximate causation analysis at issue in Cleveland’s public nuisance claim against 
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the cities have failed to allege injuries “fairly traceable” to the defendants’ 
conduct.  Thus, Baltimore and Memphis should be found to have failed to 
properly allege constitutional standing, by virtue of the dubious causal 
theory intended to satisfy the second element of this test for subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
I begin with the Holmes test, and a reemphasis of its three prongs:  (1) 
whether more direct victims of the defendant’s wrongful conduct can be 
counted on to act as private attorneys general, (2) whether estimating 
plaintiff’s damages will be a strenuous affair and (3) whether complicated 
apportionment of damages will be in order to obviate the risk of multiple 
recoveries.
196
 
To start, there are thousands of more direct victims of the lenders’ 
reverse redlining—the foreclosed-upon homeowners themselves.
197
  A 
private class action under the FHA would encompass a theory of liability 
significantly less attenuated than the one currently advanced by Baltimore 
and Memphis:  By targeting urban minority borrowers with subprime 
products on the basis of race, the borrowers were harmed by paying 
significantly more than they would have otherwise, had they received the 
prime loans to which they may have been entitled.  Additionally, those 
homeowners that defaulted on their mortgages due to the onerous terms and 
conditions of those subprime loans and were subsequently foreclosed upon 
can allege that but-for the reverse redlining to which they were subjected, 
they would have neither paid significantly more for their homes, nor 
suffered the emotional and financial trauma of foreclosure and eviction.  
This theory of liability implicates much fewer of the innumerable economic 
variables that Baltimore and Memphis’ complaints do.
198
  Separately, with 
regard to directness of injury, Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co. made the following observation:  “The 
general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go 
beyond the first step.  As it does not attribute remote consequences to a 
 
subprime mortgage securitizers. 
 196.  Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992). 
 197.  Cf. Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303, 
at *11 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (stating that “the persons who were deceived by the 
wrongful acts of the Defendants were not the Plaintiffs or proposed class members, but 
rather the purchasers whose loan applications were falsified”). 
 198.  See, e.g., Barrett v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-10157-RWZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30713 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2011) (certifying class of African American borrowers suing 
H&R Block for lending and fair housing violations); Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 2:08-cv-
01297-LDD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13776 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2009) (denying GMAC’s 
motion to dismiss proposed class action alleging fair housing violations); Miller v. 
Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying Countrywide’s 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss suit alleging racially motivated lending practices). 
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defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a 
loss.”
199
  This restrictive rule remains good law, with circuit courts 
referencing and applying it in various opinions within the RICO context.
200
  
The wholly derivative nature of the municipalities’ injuries pushes toward 
the conclusion that their harms, while real, fall into that category of indirect 
injuries, which push toward a finding that standing is lacking. 
As stated by the Baltimore, Birmingham and Cleveland courts, 
innumerable causal factors stand between the loan officer’s initial decision 
to target an African American borrower with a subprime loan, and the city 
comptroller’s final report of significantly lowered property tax receipts.
201
  
First, a foreclosure on the residential property must occur.  This requires 
the borrower to default, a decision that could occur for any number of 
reasons independent of Wells Fargo’s reverse redlining, including illness in 
the household, a layoff or the borrower’s voluntary default due to 
significant negative equity in the property.
202
  Next, the bank must elect to 
foreclose on the property.
203
  While that in and of itself may be sufficient to 
 
 199.  S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918). 
 200.  E.g., Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983 (2010) (ruling that 
city failed to allege RICO violation because defendant’s purported mail and wire fraud 
scheme was not direct cause of city’s lost tax revenue); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. 
Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Holmes for proposition that a RICO action 
to recover from derivative injuries is barred by remoteness principles); Adams-Lundy v. 
Ass’n of Prof’l Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing plaintiffs’ 
RICO claims for failure to allege anything but indirect injuries); NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C. 
v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1987) (dismissing derivative company stockholder’s 
derivative RICO claim); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Justice 
Holmes’s ‘tendency’—that the indirectly injured party may not sue—is equally well-
established.”); Grip-Pak , Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(discussing tort principle of remoteness in the context of antitrust law); Nat’l Steel Corp. v. 
Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (referencing Darnell-Taenzer in 
negligent tort context); Drug Mart Pharmacy v. Am. Home Prods., 296 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (referencing Holmes in granting motion for partial summary judgment); 
Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6141, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 1993) (stating that a plaintiff who complains of 
injury derivative of third person’s harm suffered by defendant “generally stands at too 
remote a distance to recover”); Milwaukee v. Universal Mortg. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992 
(E.D. Wis. 1988) (dismissing state RICO complaints because city did not suffer sufficiently 
direct injury at hands of mortgage companies). 
 201.  E.g., City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123123 at *12 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (stating that “a series of speculative 
inferences must be drawn to connect the injuries asserted with the alleged wrongful 
conduct”). 
 202.  See Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 at *11-12 (noting that borrowers could 
have defaulted on their mortgages due to “unemployment, health problems, a general 
weakening in the economy, or other financial conditions”). 
 203.  Id. at *12 (emphasizing that a bank must make a conscious decision to foreclose on 
the property, rather than attempt to restructure the loan). 
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force prices downward on that property and surrounding properties, the 
effect of reverse redlining on real estate values is inseparable from the 
other economic forces acting simultaneously on local real estate markets.  
During the years in which Wells Fargo engaged in reverse redlining, a 
financial maelstrom swept the country.  A financial crisis triggered broader 
macroeconomic declines that worked to push house prices down across the 
country.  The spillover into the labor market impacted household 
purchasing power, further crimping aggregate demand for real estate.  The 
grinding, decades-long deindustrialization of major American cities, 
including Baltimore, did nothing to slow the free fall of real estate values.  
This is to say nothing of the existing inner city decay that already wracked 
these metropolitan areas, pushing more and more Americans into poverty.  
With this many forces working to lower house prices, it becomes 
impossible to say with any degree of certainty that a lender’s alleged 
reverse redlining was even a partial contributor to the municipalities’ 
woes.
204
 
Yet even once the last homeowner has been evicted and the “For Sale” 
signs have been planted in the front yard, the banks were still not 
responsible for the criminal actors who moved to exploit the new dead 
zones that arose in the wake of the U.S. housing bubble.  Squatters, of their 
own volition, chose to move into properties.  The drug dealers were the 
ones who capitalized on abandoned properties to erect new open-air drug 
markets.
205
  These are yet more links and independent actors in the causal 
chain that produced the fiscal harms sued upon by Baltimore and 
Memphis.
206
  By itself, the sheer indirectness of the cities’ injuries should 
suffice to support a finding that they lack the standing to pursue FHA 
claims against the lenders under the common law tests for antitrust and 
 
 204.  See Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (D. 
Md. 2009) (noting complaint’s implausibility when considered “against the background of 
other factors leading to the deterioration of the inner city, such as extensive unemployment, 
lack of educational opportunity and choice, irresponsible parenting, disrespect for the law, 
widespread drug use, and violence”); see also Kaing v. Pulte Homes, Inc., No. 09-5057 SC, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21320, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s theory . . . 
depends upon a chain of causation that is dependent upon many factors, ‘such as 
unemployment, health problems, a general weakening economy, or other financial 
conditions,’” and that “[a]ny injury suffered by Plaintiff . . . necessarily depends upon a 
causal chain that includes numerous individual decisions of ‘some third part[ies] not before 
the court.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 at *11-
12, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). 
 205.  See City of Birmingham, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123123, at *13 (“The loss of tax 
revenue from property taxes and the increase in spending, like the depreciation in home 
values, could have been caused by any number of factors having nothing to do with the 
Defendants’ alleged ‘reverse redlining.’”). 
 206.  See id. 
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RICO standing.  The similarities between the plaintiffs’ causal theory in 
these FHA cases and those in the firearm and tobacco litigation are simply 
too great to ignore.
207
  A district court would be well within established 
standing law to grant lenders’ 12(b)(1) motions, based on the sheer 
indirectness of the cities’ theories of liability.  However, for the sake of 
completeness, I engage the rest of the Holmes and Associated General 
tests. 
As for the second element of the Holmes test, the estimated damages 
sustained by Baltimore and Memphis are speculative at best and 
unknowable at worst.  The municipalities would have to demonstrate:  (1) 
how many minority borrowers would have taken out non-subprime loans 
(or not taken out home loans at all) or chosen to refinance existing 
mortgages, (2) whether those homeowners would still be in their homes in 
the face of an array of wildly-fluctuating macroeconomic variables during a 
global economic meltdown, and (3) whether the lenders’ alleged reverse 
redlining practices were the primary culprits behind the foreclosures.
208
  
The cities would have to estimate some realistic baseline scenario 
consisting of what property tax receipts and municipal expenditures on the 
relevant properties may have been in a world devoid of reverse redlining to 
provide the courts with even an approximate sense of the damages.  The 
current complaints fail to supply any rough estimations of what savings 
would have accrued to the cities were they not forced to expend sums of 
money on maintaining and patrolling abandoned residential units.  While 
the Baltimore and Memphis complaints go into great detail about the 
specific residential properties impacted by Wells Fargo’s alleged reverse 
redlining and the municipal services extended to limit the urban fallout, 
neither complaint provides a rough approximation of the savings that 
would have accrued to the public fisc were the foreclosure wave averted.
209
  
Although this kind of alternative financial scenario projection has never 
been held necessary to show standing in an antitrust or RICO context, it 
only solidifies the impression of “vast uncertainty” regarding the cities’ 
damages.
210
  Those who would argue that the cities have standing would 
 
 207.  See supra note 131; see also City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 
N.E.2d 1136, 1151-56 (Ohio 2002) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (applying Holmes to conclude 
that the issue of directness should preclude the court from finding that the city had standing 
to sue Beretta). 
 208.  See Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303, at *11-12 (listing economic variables 
that could plausibly have reduced the value of plaintiffs’ homes, including mortgagors’ 
default, banks’ decision to foreclose rather than restructure and deterioration of the regional 
labor market). 
 209.  See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4 (describing the city’s expenditures on 
preserving vacant housing units). 
 210.  Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 441 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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likely cite the hedonic regressions offered by the city-plaintiffs in these 
cases as sufficient to remove the uncertainty that shrouds the damages 
alleged by plaintiffs.  As this Comment later discusses, empirical estimates, 
while helpful, should not be allowed to usurp the role reserved for judicial 
intuition in gauging whether cities are the proper parties to bring suit. 
Finally, the risk of double recoveries against the lenders is eminent 
here.  I concede that the damages sought by the cities here are proprietary 
in nature:  Foregone property tax receipts and the expenditures required to 
keep large swathes of the cities from falling into disrepair.  By definition, 
the interests to be vindicated in these lawsuits are specific to the cities and 
not to the now-foreclosed-upon homeowners.
211
  However, any damages 
awarded to the cities for lost property tax receipts or forced municipal 
expenditures would be necessarily contingent on calculations derived from 
homeowners’ damages and reductions in the residential properties’ 
historical real estate value as impacted by the lenders’ reverse redlining 
practices.  Thus, “duplicate recoveries and apportionment are a real 
concern.”
212
  Any recovery for the cities would necessarily be a result of 
“complex rules for apportioning damages because there would be multiple 
levels of injured plaintiffs.”
213
  Additionally, any damages inflicted by 
Wells Fargo would have to be considered alongside potential reverse 
redlining of other mortgage lenders doing business within city limits.
214
  
Other lenders’ practices that resulted in foreclosure on residential units 
adjacent to homes purchased with Wells Fargo loans could easily impact 
the appraisal value of those properties, thus reducing the property tax 
receipts received by cities on these Wells Fargo units.  The lenders do not 
operate in a vacuum; rather, their separate contributions to the housing 
market bust would have to be carefully parsed and allocated simply to 
prevent a double recovery for the same harm, but also for other lenders’ 
conduct, whether they were party to the litigation or not.  Under the Holmes 
 
The R.I. Laborers court noted the risks involved in holding that the plaintiff-fund had 
standing: “Allowing suits by those injured only indirectly would open the door to ‘massive 
and complex damages litigation . . . .’”  R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (D.R.I. 2000) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. 
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992)). 
 211.  See Engel, supra note 41, at 361 (stating that when cities “bring suits for damages 
in their proprietary capacities, cities are acting to protect their own interests and must meet 
the traditional Article III and prudential standing requirements”) (citing Alfred L. Snapp & 
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)). 
 212.  Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 442. 
 213.  R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 179. 
 214.  Cf. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 
2d 245, 263-264 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[L]ogistical problems involved in apportioning damages 
between the very distinct groups of defendants . . . tilts against a finding proximate cause.”). 
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test, this militates against a finding of standing for the cities. 
The cities fare no better under the six-pronged Associated General test 
for antitrust standing.  The first, fourth and fifth elements of the test, 
focusing on the causal link between the lenders’ wrongdoing and plaintiffs’ 
harm and the speculative nature of damages, are replicated by the first and 
second elements of the Holmes test.  The second element of the Associated 
General test, addressing defendants’ intent to harm the plaintiff, would 
likely resolve in favor of the lenders.
215
  Even assuming that the banks 
waged a systematic campaign to manipulate large segments of the African 
American communities of Baltimore and Memphis into accepting subprime 
loans, it is doubtful that the defendants did so with the specific goal of 
injuring the municipal entities governing the cities.  The third element asks 
whether the injury sued upon relates to the congressional goals behind the 
statute providing the cause of action.
216
  It is reasonable to presume that 
suing to recover from economic losses sustained by race-based lending lies 
within the realm of harms envisioned by the fair-lending laws.  The sixth 
and final elements are functionally identical to the third component of the 
Holmes inquiry, and they resolve in the same manner. 
Under either the antitrust or civil RICO test for standing, a court 
would be hard-pressed to conclude that Baltimore’s and Memphis’ 
complaints, as currently formed, allege injuries “fairly traceable” to the 
lenders’ conduct.  Thus, I conclude that the cities should be found to lack 
Article III standing to pursue their FHA claims against the lenders. 
A. Response to Critics:  If Cities Have Standing to Sue Under the 
FHA, What Are the Limits? 
My position on municipalities’ capacity to sue under the FHA could 
be fairly construed as a narrow interpretation of existing standing law.
217
  
However, if cities can be said to have Article III standing to sue under the 
FHA for economic losses sustained due to lenders’ reverse redlining, who 
is not amenable to FHA suits every time a municipality sustains a monetary 
loss, any portion of which could conceivably be traced back to an action 
 
 215.  See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 
912, 924 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing the second element of Associated General as “the 
specific intent of defendant to harm plaintiff”). 
 216.  See id. (describing the third element of Associated General as “the nature of 
plaintiff’s alleged injury . . . and whether it relates to the purpose of the antitrust laws”). 
 217.  See discussion supra Part II (summarizing Engel’s and Brescia’s broad views of 
standing and the latter’s argument that cities possess constitutional standing to sue under the 
Fair Housing Act based on a generous standard of causation for municipality-sponsored 
lawsuits). 
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performed at any point in time by the defendant?  I pose a few 
hypotheticals to show the flaws inherent in this position. 
Under the more liberal benchmark for Article III standing on FHA 
claims espoused by the existing literature, the city of New York could sue 
Wall Street investment banks for recklessly financing the subprime 
mortgage markets after their shortsighted behavior resulted in economic 
collapse, which in turn led to mass downsizing in the U.S. financial sector, 
resulting in less taxable income, thereby forcing the city to scale back its 
provision of essential services to residents.
218
  Like the local governments 
at issue in this Comment, the City of New York would constitute an 
aggrieved person under the FHA, because it was injured by statutory 
violations.
219
  Thus, the city would be entitled to sue on this Rube 
Goldberg-esque theory of liability, regardless of the number of links in the 
causal chain.  Any city that sustained a loss of tax revenue that could 
theoretically be traced back to the bursting of the housing bubble would be 
entitled to gain access to the federal courts through a direct suit against 
financial institutions. 
The converse of the immediate FHA litigation would also survive a 
12(b)(1) motion under this generous standard for federal jurisdiction.  
Where conventional redlining prevented otherwise qualified African 
American borrowers from borrowing to purchase homes, city governments 
would have lost a highly lucrative opportunity to benefit from the 
residential real estate boom years of the early first decade of the twenty-
first century.  By being denied the opportunity to partake in the frenzied 
bubble years, cities were prevented from realizing increased property tax 
revenues on properties subject to inflated prices.  Similarly, sales tax 
receipts were depressed as city residents were prevented from drawing on 
the equity in their homes to fund consumption of household goods and 
consumer durables.  As a result, lenders’ redlining would have blocked 
cities from funding expanded access to education for city residents, 
increased police patrols through troubled neighborhoods, and improved 
public infrastructure.  Where the theory of liability is permitted to be 
stretched to the breaking point and injuries are allowed to be calculated 
using the help of economic counterfactuals, this level of permissiveness in 
the pleadings means that the plaintiff’s ability to access the federal 
courthouse is limited only by the attorney’s imagination. 
There is no principled reason to limit the extreme flexibility of this 
 
 218.  See Brescia, supra note 57, at 42 (“According to black letter law, when the 
appropriate governmental body is seeking relief from a public nuisance, it need not plead 
and prove special injury; rather, harm to the community is all it must show.”). 
 219.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2012) (defining an “[a]ggrieved person” as anyone 
who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice”). 
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perspective on constitutional standing to suits by public entities.  For 
example, real estate developers would conceivably have a viable cause of 
action against lenders under the existing literature’s approach.  After the 
banks engaged in reverse redlining while issuing subprime loans, 
foreclosure waves wracked every major U.S. city.  The subsequent erasure 
of household net worth at the macro level put the realistic possibility of 
homeownership beyond the reach of many Americans.  As a result, real 
estate developers realized reduced profits over the short and medium-run 
due to lenders’ FHA violations. 
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the infinitely elastic 
nature of such an overly generous interpretation of standing jurisprudence.  
Failing to set boundaries on standing would result in any municipality 
gaining access to the courts merely by alleging economic loss that could 
conceivably be traced back to an FHA violation, no matter how implausible 
the theory or the number of intervening actors.  Endorsement of such a 
view on standing would leave the doctrine a hollow shell devoid of any 
substance. 
One response to this critique, as offered by the plaintiffs in Baltimore 
and Memphis, is to employ statistical analysis to parse and quantify the 
financial harm to the cities that could be directly attributable to reverse 
redlining.
220
  Using econometric analysis, the plaintiffs can produce precise 
estimations of the pecuniary damage created by the defendant lenders’ 
conduct.  In the next section, I dispute the notion that regression analysis is 
sufficient to cure this defect in the cities’ complaints. 
B. Hedonic Regressions: Gutting the “Fairly Traceable” Analysis 
For decades, the economics discipline has relied on complex 
econometric analysis to conduct empirical research.  Regression analysis is 
the Swiss Army knife of modern economic research, allowing the user to 
sift reams of data and piece together causal links between two or more 
variables.  The city-plaintiffs in Baltimore and Memphis, in fine-tuning 
their pleadings to surmount the “fairly traceable” element of the standing 
analysis, offered to present the results of hedonic regressions.
221
  They 
 
 220.  See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 201 (“Using a well-established 
statistical regression technique that focuses on effects on neighboring properties, the City 
and County have isolated the lost property value attributable to each individual foreclosure 
or vacancy from losses attributable to other causes, such as neighborhood conditions.”). 
 221.  See id.; see also Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 325 (“The loss in 
assessed property value in the sub-neighborhoods caused by Wells Fargo’s unlawful acts 
and consequent foreclosures can then be, and in significant measure has been, used to 
calculate the City’s corresponding loss in property tax revenues.”). 
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promised to separate with some degree of statistical certainty the precise 
dollar impact of Wells Fargo’s purported reverse redlining practices.
222
 
The cities’ ability to provide statistical estimates of the damage 
inflicted by Wells Fargo and Citigroup’s purported reverse redlining should 
trigger the same judicial skepticism that the pension funds and providers 
received in the tobacco litigation.  There, one court rejected the proffered 
statistical modeling, saying that “we do not believe that aggregation and 
statistical modeling are sufficient to get the Funds over the hurdle of the 
[Associated General] factor focusing on whether the ‘damages claim . . . is 
highly speculative.’”
223
 
While the econometric analysis may prove capable of estimating the 
fiscal effects of lenders’ FHA violations on city property values, if we wish 
to keep standing doctrine alive, such analysis should be rejected by courts 
as unsatisfactory for the purpose of alleging harm “fairly traceable” to 
defendants’ conduct.  To do otherwise is to fling the courthouse doors open 
for any litigant who can afford the services of a halfway-competent 
statistician.  Furthermore, introducing regression analysis as a condition to 
maintaining an FHA action effectively transforms the motion to dismiss 
stage into a battle of the econometricians, as plaintiff and defendant grapple 
over the robustness of plaintiff’s econometric model, theoretical 
assumptions and the quality of empirical data.  This would be tantamount 
to judicial ceding of the standing inquiry to the economists.  Just as courts 
are cautioned to know the limits of judicial competence, so should they be 
aware of what lies well within the juridical domain.
224
  Courts should reject 
as inadequate the cities’ furnishing of empirical data to satisfy the “fairly 
 
 222.  See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 326 (“Application of hedonic 
regression to data regularly maintained by Baltimore permits precise quantification of the 
injury to the City caused by Defendants’ discriminatory lending practices and resulting 
foreclosures in sub-neighborhoods where Wells Fargo foreclosures constitute at least one-
third of all foreclosures.”). 
 223.  R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 174, 
186 (D.R.I. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Allegheny Gen. 
Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff-hospitals’ 
argument that the court “can calculate damages through aggregation and statistical 
modeling” because “speculative calculations create a vast uncertainty about the Hospitals’ 
damages, and leads us to question whether a remediable injury exists”). 
 224.  Compare Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (applying a multifactor test 
to measure “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion” to hold that political gerrymandering was a political 
question, foreclosing the possibility of judicial intervention), with Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 
274 (1st Cir. 2005) (using Baker v. Carr’s multifactor test for justiciability to find that 
political question doctrine did not bar court from hearing case) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962)). 
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traceable” component of the Article III standing inquiry. 
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
CITIES’ LACK OF ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE 
FHA 
The result I reach is an unhappy one:  Assuming the foregoing 
analysis is correct, who is left to seek judicial redress for the harms 
inflicted on cities and homeowners by mortgage lenders’ practices?  Class 
actions on behalf of homeowners victimized by reverse redlining are a 
potential solution.  However, the national mortgage settlement, as expected, 
largely absolves the mortgage providers from “certain violations of civil 
law based on the banks’ mortgage loan servicing activities . . . .”
225
  While 
individual litigants remain generally free to bring claims, the near-total 
release from civil liability as relating to enforcement actions brought by 
state attorneys general and federal regulators is staggering in its breadth.
226
  
Depending on the vagaries of state law, cities may also be able to sue in 
their respective jurisdictions’ courts under state law causes of action.
227
  
Article III’s standing requirements are limited to those plaintiffs that seek 
to invoke the federal judicial power.
228
 
But make no mistake:  I do not argue that the lenders were not largely 
responsible for much of the financial upheaval that has wracked the nation 
in the last several years.  The housing boom provided us with no shortage 
of horror stories detailing the consequences of banks’ often times reckless, 
exploitative and illegal lending policies from the last several years.
229
  This 
 
 225.  Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Agreement, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_
Settlement/Mortgage_Servicing_Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
 226.  Id. at 4. 
 227.  The likelihood of success on this approach is uncertain.  See Engel, supra note 41, 
at 365 (“Only a handful of jurisdictions have reported decisions addressing municipal 
standing as quasi-sovereigns, leaving most cities in the dark about their ability to bring such 
claims.”). 
 228.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“The party invoking 
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”). 
 229.  E.g., Joshua Rhett Miller, Bank of America to Pay Florida Couple in Mistaken 
Foreclosure Case, FOX NEWS (June 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/06/bank-
america-pays-florida-couple-in-mistaken-foreclosure-case/ (“Bank of America mistakenly 
filed a foreclosure claim against the couple despite the absence of a mortgage, prompting 
the Nyergeses to take the matter to court.  The couple eventually won, but then asked Bank 
of America to pay for $2,534 in attorney fees.  A Collier County judge ruled the bank 
should pay, but the bank never did.”); Franco Ordonez, Major Banks Possibly Foreclosed 
Illegally on Military Personnel, DENVER POST (Dec. 1, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www. 
denverpost.com/business/ci_19444085. 
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is to say nothing of the array of other reprehensible activities that they have 
engaged in, wholly separate from predatory lending.
230
  This Comment 
addresses the jurisdictional barrier to cities’ recovery, not the merits of 
their complaints.  But even assuming that no one will be left to seek 
judicial redress for lenders’ reverse redlining practices, that in itself does 
not justify a finding of municipal standing to sue, simply to “Make 
Everything Come Out Right.”
231
  Federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is distinctive in that it is the 
only basis that courts can use to justify sua sponte dismissal of a case.
232
  
The paramount importance of preserving courts’ traditional role in our 
representative democracy mandates deference to the historical standing 
doctrine, along with acknowledgment that cities’ inability to sue lenders 
under the FHA is symptomatic of their marginal role in the federal 
system.
233
  Perhaps this is a feature, not a bug. 
To reiterate, the standing inquiry exists to carefully circumscribe the 
court’s role in a democratic society.  To prevent the judiciary from falling 
into the habit of regularly issuing judgments on abstract questions of public 
policy, standing imposes upon plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating “a 
‘personal stake in the outcome’ . . . to ‘assure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues necessary for the proper 
 
 230.  Jeff Horwitz, Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty 
Records, 177 AMERICAN BANKER 62 (Mar. 30, 2012) (detailing Bank of America’s sale of 
credit card receivables, despite incomplete and inaccurate records documenting consumers’ 
debts); Jeff Horwitz, OCC Probing JPMorgan Chase Credit Card Collections, 177 AM. 
BANKER 40 (Mar. 14, 2012) (describing “procedural shortcuts” and “faulty account records” 
used to sue thousands of delinquent credit card borrowers); William Selway & Martin Z. 
Braun, Wells Fargo Pays $148 Million to Settle Wachovia Muni Bid-Rigging Charges, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-08/wells-
fargo-pays-148-million-to-settle-wachovia-muni-bid-rigging-charges.html; William Selway 
et al, Jefferson County, Alabama, Votes to Declare Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-
09/alabama-s-jefferson-county-votes-for-biggest-municipal-bankruptcy-in-u-s-.html 
(describing “[t]wo former JPMorgan bankers [who] are fighting Securities and Exchange 
Commission charges that they made $8 million in undisclosed payments to friends of 
commissioners to secure the bank’s role” in interest rate swaps that moved against Jefferson 
County, resulting in the county’s declaring Chapter 9 bankruptcy). 
 231.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 232.  See Gilmore v. Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 11-12747, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2237, at *2-3 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (stating that federal courts are obligated to determine 
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, sua sponte); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 
F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “it is well settled that a federal court is obligated 
to inquire into the existence of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) 
(mandating that federal courts dismiss any action where the court determines that subject-
matter jurisdiction is lacking). 
 233.  See Schragger, supra note 82, at 2576. 
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resolution of constitutional questions.’”
234
  As Chief Justice Roberts 
observed in Massachusetts v. EPA, “standing jurisprudence simply 
recognizes that redress of [certain types of] grievances . . . ‘is the function 
of Congress and the Chief Executive,’ not the federal courts.”
235
  Standing 
evolved out of a need to prevent the federal courts from becoming the 
default mechanism by which public policy disputes were resolved, rather 
than the political branches. 
The questions of how to resolve the financial crisis of the last few 
years, who to blame, and what types of punishments are to be meted out are 
best reserved to the executive and legislative branches.  Those domains 
have, by their actions, made a conscious political decision to sanction the 
worst excesses of the boom years, including unethical, dangerous, and 
illegal activity at the highest echelons of Wall Street, to preserve financial 
stability and a still-ongoing economic recovery.  The elected officials 
accountable to us have made this judgment call.  As subordinate players in 
the federal system, cities should not be permitted to undermine that 
political decision, however flawed and shortsighted, by waging their own 
wars against the banks in the federal judiciary, whether on their own behalf 
or on behalf of resident taxpayers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is no serious dispute as to the culpability of banks, mortgage 
lenders and all other financial actors complicit in the largest financial crisis 
in the post-war era.  Nonetheless, this does not absolve federal courts of the 
responsibility to ensure that jurisdictional requirements are satisfied before 
hearing disputes between two parties.  “The constitutional role of the 
courts . . . is to decide concrete cases—not to serve as a convenient forum 
for policy debates.”
236
  The dilution or destruction of a longstanding 
judicial doctrine fashioned to preserve the constitutional separation of 
powers is too heavy a price to pay so that municipalities may make an end 
run around our non-functioning political branches.  Allowing cities to wage 
a political battle in the judicial arena would only work to damage the 
integrity of the federal court system.  Such an outcome would be infinitely 
more harmful in the long run than the urban blight sustained by those 
municipalities. 
 
 234.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
 235.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)). 
 236.  Id. at 547 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). 
